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INTRODUCTION
The United States is home to less than five percent of the world’s total
population, yet houses nearly twenty-five percent of the world’s prison
population.1 Almost one-third of Americans have a criminal record.2 For
the past twelve years, an average of 650,000 people have been released
annually from federal and state prisons.3 Over ninety-five percent of people

1. See The Prison Crisis, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/prison-crisis [https://perma.cc/
AE9U-346G].
2. See U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URB. DEV., OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL GUIDANCE ON
APPLICATION OF FAIR HOUSING ACT STANDARDS TO THE USE OF CRIMINAL RECORDS BY
PROVIDERS OF HOUSING AND REAL ESTATE-RELATED TRANSACTIONS 1 (Apr. 4, 2016),
[hereinafter HUD GUIDANCE 2016] https://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/documents/huddoc?
id=HUD_OGCGuidAppFHAStandCR.pdf [https://perma.cc/RM5C-WD98].
3. See id. at 1.
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currently incarcerated in state prisons will be released at some point in the
future.4 Where will they live?
This issue has especially impacted Black communities throughout the
United States. Indeed, Black Americans are vastly overrepresented in the
American prison system: 1 million of the 2.3 million people currently
incarcerated are Black Americans.5 Statistically, Black Americans make up
13.3 percent of the total population of the United States yet comprise 37.8
percent of the federal incarcerated population.6 In other words, Black
Americans are incarcerated at “nearly three times their proportion of the
general population.”7
For many formerly incarcerated people, the pathway to reentering society
is fraught with obstacles. One substantial barrier is obtaining access to safe,
secure, and affordable housing—an integral step for successful reentry.8
This is particularly true for formerly incarcerated people of color.
Historically, the federal government supported state-sanctioned segregation
and created stringent policies to keep formerly incarcerated people of color
out of white neighborhoods and public housing.9 However, under the Obama
Administration, the federal government generated regulations and guidance
under the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”) to combat housing discrimination that
formerly incarcerated people face.
The FHA prohibits discrimination in housing based on “race, color,
religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.”10 In 2013, the Department
of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) issued a regulation that
4. Timothy Hughes & Doris James Wilson, Reentry Trends in the United States, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUST., BUREAU OF JUST. STATS. (last revised Apr. 14, 2004), http://www.bjs.gov/
content/pub/pdf/reentry.pdf [https://perma.cc/JF3W-3NCV]; HUD GUIDANCE 2016, supra
note 2, at 1.
5. See Criminal Justice Fact Sheet, NAACP, http://www.naacp.org/criminal-justicefact-sheet/ [https://perma.cc/484F-TCNX].
6. See Inmate Statistics, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS (last updated Mar. 25, 2017),
https://www.bop.gov/about/statistics/statistics_inmate_race.jsp
[https://perma.cc/936MXCRJ]; Quick Facts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/table/
PST045215/00#headnote-js-a [https://perma.cc/7FAJ-R25U].
7. See HUD GUIDANCE 2016, supra note 2, at 3.
8. See Jocelyn Fontaine & Jennifer Biess, Housing as a Platform for Formerly
Incarcerated Persons, WHAT WORKS COLLABORATIVE, URB. INST. 1 (Apr. 2012),
http://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/alfresco/publication-pdfs/412552-Housing-as-aPlatform-for-Formerly-Incarcerated-Persons.pdf [https://perma.cc/JE23-8P5Z].
9. See Ta-Nehisi Coates, The Case for Reparations, ATLANTIC (June 2014),
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2014/06/the-case-for-reparations/361631/
[https://perma.cc/XWZ6-J37S] (explaining that the federal government in the 1950s only
distributed funding to segregated housing projects); see also U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URB.
DEV., “ONE STRIKE AND YOU’RE OUT” POLICY IN PUBLIC HOUSING, GUIDING PRINCIPLES OF A
ONE STRIKE POLICY 5 (Mar. 1996), [hereinafter HUD, ONE STRIKE AND YOU’RE OUT] in HUD
Directive No. 96-16 (Apr. 12, 1996).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b).
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formalized a three-part burden-shifting test11 to prove disparate impact
liability under the FHA.12 Under this regulation, a practice has a
discriminatory effect if it actually, or predictably, will result in a disparate
impact on a protected group.13 In 2015, the Supreme Court recognized the
disparate impact liability theory based on its interpretation of the FHA in
Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive
Communities Project, Inc.14 However, the Court limited the application of
disparate impact claims brought under the FHA by enacting certain
“safeguards” that apply at the pleadings stage, making establishing a prima
facie case more challenging.15 Also in 2015, HUD issued guidance to Public
Housing Authorities (“PHAs”) and owners of federally assisted housing,
prohibiting the use of arrest records as a basis for denying admission,
terminating assistance, or evicting tenants from federally subsidized
housing.16 In 2016, HUD issued further guidance to detail how the disparate
impact test applied to formerly incarcerated people.17 HUD recognized that
having a criminal record is not a protected characteristic under the FHA, but
that criminal record barriers to housing disproportionately affect racial and
ethnic minorities.18 According to this guidance, an individual who is
discriminated against on the basis of her past criminal conviction may bring
a disparate impact claim against a housing provider19 if she can prove “that
the [housing provider’s] policy results in a disparate impact on a group of
persons because of their race or national origin.”20 This guidance does not
detail the limitations established by the Court in Texas v. Inclusive
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

See infra Section I.E.
See 24 C.F.R. § 100.500.
See id. § 100.500(a).
135 S. Ct. 2507, 2507 (2015).
See infra Section I.E.
See GUIDANCE FOR PUBLIC HOUSING AGENCIES (PHAS) AND OWNERS OF FEDERALLYASSISTED HOUSING ON EXCLUDING THE USE OF ARREST RECORDS IN HOUSING DECISIONS 2
(Nov. 2, 2015), [hereinafter HUD GUIDANCE 2015] http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/
documents/huddoc?id=PIH2015-19.pdf [https://perma.cc/R7WP-7G3W] (explaining that
arrest records alone cannot be used as a basis for denying housing; PHAs have discretion to
consider circumstances; HUD does not require “one strike” policies; PHAs must ensure that
applicants’ and tenants’ due process rights are upheld; and that all policies must be in
compliance with the FHA, Americans with Disabilities Act, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and
the Rehabilitation Act).
17. See HUD GUIDANCE 2016, supra note 2, at 3-4, 7.
18. See id. at 2.
19. The Fair Housing Act, in some circumstances, exempts owner-occupied buildings that
have four or fewer units, single family housing that is rented or sold without a broker, and
housing that is operated by private clubs and religious organizations that restrict occupancy
to members only. See Fair Housing–It’s Your Right, DEP’T OF HOUS. & URB. DEV.,
https://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/program_offices/fair_housing_equal_opp/FHLa
ws/yourrights [https://perma.cc/5DM3-GA5T]; 42 U.S.C. §§ 3603(b), 3606, and 3607(a).
20. HUD GUIDANCE 2016, supra note 2, at 3; see infra Section I.E.

2017]

DISPARATE IMPACT LACKS AN IMPACT

533

Communities.21 As a result, the more plaintiff-friendly HUD guidance and
regulations and the more defendant-friendly 2015 decision by the Court are
in tension and may result in conflicting outcomes in the future.22
This Note argues that disparate impact litigation alone is insufficient to
provide formerly incarcerated people access to safe, affordable, and stable
housing. Even with the HUD regulations and guidance and the Court’s
recent recognition of the disparate impact theory under the FHA, the current
litigation model is ineffective for four reasons. First, over the past forty
years, plaintiffs have experienced limited success litigating disparate impact
claims. Second, the more stringent pleading requirements (or “safeguards”)
outlined in Texas v. Inclusive Communities will only make it more
challenging for plaintiffs to initiate successful disparate impact claims.
Third, litigation is a slow, time-consuming, and expensive process that can
impede disadvantaged individuals from bringing claims. Lastly, the most
recent appointment on the Supreme Court, the single party dominance of the
executive and legislative branches, and the appointment of Ben Carson as
HUD Secretary23 will likely undercut the efficacy of disparate impact
litigation over the coming years. Ultimately, litigation alone is ill-equipped
to accommodate the large volume of housing discrimination that occurs
every year.
This Note examines two potential solutions to supplement the current
disparate impact litigation regime. First, this Note explores giving formerly
incarcerated people protected class status. Protected class status would allow
plaintiffs to pursue FHA claims under the disparate treatment theory.24
Plaintiffs would be able to challenge housing policies that facially
discriminate against those who have criminal records.25 However, several
hurdles would have to be overcome to pursue this approach, and the recourse
afforded—litigation—still falls short of a solution to the problem. At the
21. Compare HUD GUIDANCE 2016, supra note 2, with Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty.
Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2524 (2015).
22. Outcomes for plaintiffs may differ depending on whether an administrative hearing is
conducted versus federal litigation. See infra notes 154-56 and accompanying text. However,
one could speculate that HUD, in the current conservative administration, will align their
disparate impact policies in accordance with the Court’s narrower interpretation. See infra
notes 409-11 and accompanying text.
23. See Ben S. Carson, Experimenting with Failed Socialism Again, WASH. TIMES (July
23, 2015), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/jul/23/ben-carson-obamas-housingrules-try-to-accomplish-/ [https://perma.cc/CPU9-8APP] (“These government-engineered
attempts to legislate racial equality create consequences that often make matters worse. There
are reasonable ways to use housing policy to enhance the opportunities available to lowerincome citizens, but based on the history of failed socialist experiments in this country,
entrusting the government to get it right can prove downright dangerous.”).
24. Unlike disparate impact, disparate treatment addresses policies and practices that
facially discriminate against a protected class of individuals. See infra Section II.B.2.
25. See infra Section II.B.2.
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outset, whether formerly incarcerated people meet the legal criteria for
protected class status is debatable. Moreover, like disparate impact,
disparate treatment is often hard to prove26 and is still rooted in the litigation
regime, thus subject to the aforementioned problems. This Note concludes
that the feasibility of a protected class designation is questionable.
As a second solution, this Note explores the adoption of the Pay for
Success (“PFS”) model in conjunction with the use of Social Impact Bonds
(“SIBs”) to operate outside the litigation framework by funding housing
programs for formerly incarcerated people. The PFS model is a privatepublic partnership for the achievement of a social good.27 Under the PFS
model, partnerships can be forged with non-profits or other service providers
whose programs have been shown to achieve successful outcomes (“proven
models” or “proven programs”) to expand the reach of their services to larger
populations.28 Thus, proven models can be scaled up to effectively provide
safe, stable, and affordable housing to more formerly incarcerated people.
This Note concludes that this solution, if implemented responsibly, is a more
viable remedy that supplements the current litigation model and avoids the
problems surrounding the disparate impact test.
Part I of this Note examines the history of mass incarceration and housing
segregation in the United States that led to the current intersection of poverty,
imprisonment, segregation, and homelessness. It describes the types of
discrimination formerly incarcerated people face, reviews recent state action
regarding criminal history screening, and explains the current FHA disparate
impact litigation regime. Part II identifies the inadequacies of the current
disparate impact litigation regime by analyzing the effect Texas v. Inclusive
Communities will have, and discusses current disparate impact litigation
cases at bar. It also explores the benefits and detriments of two potential
solutions: (1) the creation of a protected class of formerly incarcerated
persons and (2) the PFS model. Part III concludes that the PFS model is a
unique solution that state and local governments should implement to help
formerly incarcerated people secure safe, stable, and affordable housing. By
expanding proven housing programs and allocating state funds based on the
specific housing needs of formerly incarcerated persons, states can

26. For example, housing providers, in an attempt to avoid disparate treatment liability,
may adopt unwritten policies that treat those with criminal records differently, making explicit
discrimination hard to prove. See infra Section II.B.2.
27. In the PFS model, the government (acting as a back-payor) contracts with one or more
service providers (typically non-profits) to provide certain social services. Private investors
provide the upfront capital to fund these services. The investor is only paid back (by the
government) if outcomes are achieved. See infra Section II.C.
28. The process of expanding proven programs to reach a larger population is typically
referred to as “scaling up.” Programs that undergo this expansion can be referred to as
“scaling programs.” See infra Section II.C.
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effectively reduce recidivism, lessen expenditures, and achieve positive
social outcomes for the formerly incarcerated population and society at large.
I. BACKGROUND
The United States imprisons more of its population than any other nation
in the developed world.29 The number of people incarcerated in the United
States has increased dramatically in the past forty years. In 1980, roughly
500,000 people were incarcerated—today, that number has quadrupled to
over 2.3 million.30 However, the demographics of the prison population do
not mirror the demographics of the American population.31 Black
Americans make up 37.8 percent of the federal prison population, but only
13.3 percent of the total U.S. population.32 White Americans make up 58.7
percent of the federal prison population, yet comprise 77.1 percent of the
total population.33 Some studies reveal that this misrepresentation does not
reflect actual disparities in illegal activity, but is instead a result of the
disproportionate criminalization of communities of color.34
Scholars attribute much of the prison population increase to the “War on
Drugs,” a policy which incarcerated many non-violent offenders,35 and the
over-policing of Black communities.36 As scholars have noted, “[b]etween

29. See Michelle Ye Hee Lee, Yes, U.S. Locks People up at a Higher Rate than Any Other
Country, WASH. POST (July 7, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/
wp/2015/07/07/yes-u-s-locks-people-up-at-a-higher-rate-than-any-other-country/
[https://perma.cc/596U-GKEL].
30. NAACP, supra note 5; Peter Wagner & Bernadette Rabuy, Mass Incarceration: The
Whole Pie 2016, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Mar. 14, 2016), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/
reports/pie2016.html [https://perma.cc/J5MJ-TA64] (“The American criminal justice system
holds more than 2.3 million people in 1,719 state prisons, 102 federal prisons, 942 juvenile
correctional facilities, 3,283 local jails, and 79 Indian Country jails as well as in military
prisons, immigration detention facilities, civil commitment centers, and prisons in the U.S.
territories.”).
31. NAACP, supra note 5; Wagner & Rabuy, supra note 30.
32. See FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, supra note 6; U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 6.
33. See FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, supra note 6; U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 6.
34. See Kate Linden Morris, Note, “Within Constitutional Limitations:” Challenging
Criminal Background Checks by Public Housing Authorities Under the Fair Housing Act, 47
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 158, 171 (2015) (“For example, research has shown that, although
people of color are no more likely to use or sell illegal drugs than Whites, they are arrested at
higher rates, and an analysis of federal sentencing data by the U.S. Sentencing Commission
in 2010 revealed that once convicted, Black people are more likely to receive higher sentences
than similarly situated White people for the same crimes.”) (internal citations omitted).
35. See generally Michael Tonry, Racial Politics, Racial Disparities, and the War on
Crime, 40 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 475 (1994). But see JOHN PFAFF, LOCKED IN: THE TRUE
CAUSES OF MASS INCARCERATION—AND HOW TO ACHIEVE REAL REFORM (2017) (arguing that
prosecutorial discretion is the true culprit of this forty year incarceration boom).
36. See, e.g., MARY PATTILLO ET AL., IMPRISONING AMERICA: THE SOCIAL EFFECTS OF
MASS INCARCERATION 2 (Mary Pattillo et al. eds. 2004) (“Although young minority men with
little schooling had relatively high rates of incarceration, before the 1980s the penal system
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1982 and 1999, drug sentences in federal and state prisons increased by 975
percent.”37 Today, non-violent offenders make up the majority of the
national prison population: 46.4 percent of incarcerated individuals are in
federal prison due to non-violent drug offenses,38 and roughly thirty-eight
percent of those convicted are Black Americans.39
Yet, even prior to the war on drugs, Black Americans have historically
been overrepresented in prisons.40 The Thirteenth Amendment of the United
States Constitution, which formally abolished slavery after the Civil War,
contains language that some scholars refer to as a “convict exception.”41 The
Thirteenth Amendment provides, in relevant part, “[n]either slavery nor
involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party
shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any
place subject to their jurisdiction.”42 Scholars argue that the original
understanding of this clause recognized that slavery was constitutionally
permitted “when the class of people to be enslaved were prison inmates.”43

was not a dominant presence in disadvantaged neighborhoods. Criminal behavior, as
officially recognized by the police, was much more unusual than poverty. The utter
marginality of prisons and other carceral institutions shaped criminological and penological
understanding of punishment.”).
37. Zach Newman, Note, “Hands up, Don’t Shoot”: Policing, Fatal Force, and Equal
Protection in the Age of Colorblindness, 43 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 117, 135 (2015) (citations
omitted).
38. T.J. Raphael & Dana Roberson, President Trump, Do You Support Rehabilitation or
Incarceration for Nonviolent Drug Offenders?, PRI (Mar. 1, 2017, 9:00 AM),
https://www.pri.org/stories/2017-03-01/president-trump-do-you-support-rehabilitation-orincarceration-nonviolent-drug [https://perma.cc/G5Q4-4L68].
39. FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, supra note 6; Sam Taxy et al., Drug Offenders in Federal
Prison: Estimates of Characteristics Based on Linked Data, DEP’T OF JUST. BUREAU OF JUST.
STATS. 3 (Oct. 2015), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/dofp12.pdf [https://perma.cc/
C857-J8ZZ] (“About three-quarters of drug offenders in federal prison were either nonHispanic black or African American (39%) or Hispanic or Latino (37%); nearly a quarter
(22%) were non-Hispanic white offenders. In addition, drug offenders in federal prison were
overwhelmingly male (92%), about a quarter (24%) were noncitizens, and nearly 80% were
age 30 or older.”).
40. See Robert Johnson et al., The American Prison in Historical Perspective: Race,
Gender, and Adjustment, in PRISONS: TODAY AND TOMORROW 22, 23 (2nd ed. 2005) (citing
T. SELLIN, SLAVERY AND THE PENAL SYSTEM, (1st ed. 1976)) (“Minorities, by contrast, have
always formed a sizable portion of the prison population. In fact, ethnic and, after the Civil
War, racial minorities have almost certainly been overrepresented in American prisons.”).
41. Taja-Nia Y. Henderson, The Ironic Promise of the Thirteenth Amendment for
Offender Anti-Discrimination Law, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1141, 1180 (2013).
42. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1 (emphasis added).
43. Henderson, supra note 41, at 1180 (“The ‘ironic promise’ is that the constitutional
provision explicitly granting states authority to coerce forced labor from convicts as
punishment within its first section is the same amendment granting Congress the authority to
limit other forms of subordination levied upon this same group in its second section.”).
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After the Civil War, there was an uptick in incarceration rates of Black
Americans in southern states due to the enactment of “Black Codes.”44
Integral to these Black Codes were vagrancy laws, which allowed local
municipalities to arrest and imprison newly freed Black Americans for minor
infractions.45 Once in prison, incarcerated persons were forced to provide
free labor, a practice known as convict leasing.46 Some scholars refer to this
practice as “slavery by another name.”47 Although Black Codes were
abolished during the Reconstruction Era, Jim Crow laws quickly took hold
in the late 1890s, mandating segregation in public places under the guise of
separate but equal.48
Once Black Americans began to move north, local governments in
northern states promulgated a host of racially discriminatory land use laws
in an attempt to keep Black people out of their white neighborhoods.49
Subsequently, the newly established Federal Housing Administration50
engaged in discriminatory lending practices known as redlining.51 Banks

44. RICHARD WORMSER, THE RISE AND FALL OF JIM CROW 8-9 (1st ed. 2003) (explaining
that these laws severely restricted the newfound freedoms of Black Americans such as the
ability to own property, purchase and lease land, conduct business, and move freely in public
places).
45. See generally DOUGLAS BLACKMON, SLAVERY BY ANOTHER NAME: THE REENSLAVEMENT OF BLACK AMERICANS FROM THE CIVIL WAR TO WORLD WAR II (1st ed. 2008).
46. See id. at 64-66; see also Whitney Benns, American Slavery, Reinvented, ATLANTIC
(Sept. 21, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/09/prison-labor-inamerica/406177/ [https://perma.cc/57YF-4SND] (“Over the decades, prison labor has
expanded in scope and reach. Incarcerated workers, laboring within in-house operations or
through convict-leasing partnerships with for-profit businesses, have been involved with
mining, agriculture, and all manner of manufacturing from making military weapons to
sewing garments for Victoria’s Secret . . . . In a sense, slavery never ended at Angola; it was
reinvented.”).
47. See, e.g., BLACKMON, supra note 45.
48. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Board of Ed.,
347 U.S. 483 (1954); David Pilgram, What Was Jim Crow, FERRIS ST. U. (2012),
http://www.ferris.edu/jimcrow/what.htm [https://perma.cc/65JR-92AT].
49. Racial zoning was used as a means of legal de jure segregation. In 1917 the Supreme
Court ruled that racial zoning was unconstitutional. See Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60,
81-82 (1917). However, this decision disallowed legal statutes, not private agreements. See
id. The enforcement of racially restrictive covenants was not disallowed until 1948. See
Shelly v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). Yet, “[i]t was not until 1968 that the actual inclusion
of racially-restrictive covenants into deeds was deemed illegal, although many such covenants
can still be found within the language of deeds today.” Historical Shift from Explicit to
Implicit Policies Affecting Housing Segregation in Eastern Massachusetts, 1948-1968:
Unenforceable Restrictive Covenants, FAIR HOUS. CTR. OF GREATER BOS., http://www.boston
fairhousing.org/timeline/1948-1968-Unenforceable-Restrictive-Covenants.html
[https://perma.cc/P2FN-BH2R].
50. The Federal Housing Administration was created in 1934 by the National Housing
Act of 1934. See 12 U.S.C. § 1701.
51. See Fair Lending Regulations and Statutes, Consumer Compliance Handbook, FED.
RES.,
https://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/supmanual/cch/fair_lend_fhact.pdf
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and financial institutions “refused loans to black families in white suburbs
and even, in most cases, to black families in black neighborhoods—leading
to the deterioration and ghettoization of those neighborhoods.”52 Many
whites living in cities and public housing bought and moved to homes in the
suburbs using low-interest mortgages.53 This concentrated Black Americans
in inner cities, and helped to produce a downward income shift in the
population residing in public housing after the 1940s.54 Eventually redlining
and a host of other discriminatory laws were challenged and repealed by
federal legislation in the 1960s.55
In an effort to subdue the unrest and unaffordability of urban housing for
people of color, in the 1960s Congress funded large public housing

[https://perma.cc/3QY4-YBA9] (“Redlining is the practice of denying a creditworthy
applicant a loan for housing in a certain neighborhood even though the applicant may
otherwise be eligible for the loan. The term refers to the presumed practice of mortgage
lenders of drawing red lines around portions of a map to indicate areas or neighborhoods in
which they do not want to make loans.”); Lorren Patterson, The Impact of Disparate Impact:
The Benefits Outweigh the Costs of Recognizing Disparate Impact Claims Under the Fair
Housing Act, 8 GEO. J.L. & MOD. CRITICAL RACE PERSP. 211, 216 (2016).
52. Richard Rothstein, The Racial Achievement Gap, Segregated Schools, and Segregated
Neighborhoods–A Constitutional Insult, RACE & SOC. PROB.S (2014), http://www.epi.org/
publication/the-racial-achievement-gap-segregated-schools-and-segregated-neighborhoodsa-constitutional-insult/ [https://perma.cc/XX92-MQDW].
53. See Historical Shift from Explicit to Implicit Policies Affecting Housing Segregation
in Eastern Massachusetts, 1950s-1975: Impact of Rte 128 & Rte 495, FAIR HOUS. CTR. OF
GREATER
BOS.,
http://www.bostonfairhousing.org/timeline/1950s-1975-Suburbs.html
[https://perma.cc/HA2M-QEKZ] (explaining that from the 1950s through 1975, large
highways were built that enabled white flight to suburban towns). From the 1970s through
today, local municipalities utilized large-lot zoning, single-family housing, minimum multifamily zoning, and restrictions on age to concentrate wealth and effectively exclude people of
color from moving to suburban areas. See Historical Shift from Explicit to Implicit Policies
Affecting Housing Segregation in Eastern Massachusetts, 1970s-Present: Disparate Impact
of Local Land Use Regulations, FAIR HOUS. CTR. OF GREATER BOS., http://www.boston
fairhousing.org/timeline/1970s-present-Local-Land_use-Regulations.html
[https://perma.cc/8DE4-27TE].
54. J.A. Stoloff, A Brief History of Public Housing, OFF. OF POL’Y DEV. & RES., DEP’T
HOUS. & URB. DEV. 6, http://reengageinc.org/research/brief_history_public_housing.pdf
(“Over time, advocates for the poor asked that preferences on waiting lists be given to the
most disadvantaged applicants, in particular to the homeless and displaced. This, combined
with income limits, ensured that public housing residents were drawn from the least well-off
segments of society. Anyone who could afford to live elsewhere moved out of public housing,
and whites had more opportunities than minorities to take advantage of government subsidies
that promoted homeownership.”).
55. See generally The Fair Housing Act of 1958, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3501 et seq. (making the
practice of redlining unlawful); The Civil Rights Act of 1964, 88 P.L. 352, 78 Stat. 241, 88
P.L. 352, 78 Stat. 241 (ending de jure segregation of public spaces). See also Stoloff, supra
note 54, at 6 (explaining the Civil Rights Act of 1964 also ended segregation in public
housing).
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projects.56 However, these projects served to reinforce already existing
racial segregation patterns.57 Residents of public housing, who were
overwhelmingly Black,58 were demonized and stereotyped, social inequities
were ignored, and violence, inner-city decay, and crime became linked with
public housing.59 In response, Congress enacted a series of more stringent
reforms that enabled PHAs to more easily screen out and evict tenants with
criminal records.60 The culmination of these policies resulted in HUD’s
1996 “One Strike” guidelines, which encouraged PHAs to adopt screening
criteria by tying funding to the implementation of these policies.61 More
often than not, these policies were in the form of blanket bans on those with
criminal records without consideration of individualized circumstances.62
Thus, those already facing legal discrimination in the private housing market
due to their criminal records also faced stringent PHA screening policies,
which effectively “locked out a population with nowhere else to live.”63

56. See Jeff R. Crump, The End of Public Housing as We Know It: Public Housing Policy,
Labor Regulation and the US City, 27 INT’L J. URB. & REG’L RES. 177, 179-80 (2003).
57. See id. at 181 (“Ghetto boundaries were made visible by highways or other spatial
barriers and the design of public housing set it apart from the urban fabric, making it easy to
identify public housing residents and keep them within well-defined borders of ‘the
projects.’”); see also Rothstein, supra note 52 (“[I]t remains an open question whether it really
was in [Black American’s] best interests to be herded into segregated projects, where their
poverty was concentrated and isolated from the American mainstream.”).
58. See Stoloff, supra note 54, at 6 (“Ironically, while ending legal discrimination by no
longer allowing racially segregated projects, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 contributed to the
movement of whites out of projects when they became racially integrated.”).
59. See Jesse Kropf, Note, Keeping “Them” Out: Criminal Record Screening, Public
Housing, and the Fight Against Racial Case, 4 GEO J.L. & MOD. CRITICAL RACE PERSP. 75,
85 (2012) (“[O]pponents demonized public housing residents . . . . Ignoring the staggering
social inequalities facing urban minority communities, public housing thus became linked
with inner-city decay and violence.”); id. at 85 n.66 (“This corresponded to a general
stigmatization of inner-city Blacks as welfare queens and gangbangers, which accompanied
the War on Drugs.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
60. See Kropf, supra note 59, at 85 n.68 (“The 1988 Anti-Drug Abuse Act granted PHAs
the power to evict any tenant engaged in any criminal activity on or near the premises. In
1996, Congress passed the Housing Opportunity and Extension Act urging PHAs to exclude
people based on their criminal records and allowing PHAs to deny applicants it believed to
be abusing alcohol or drugs, regardless of any conviction.”) (citations omitted).
61. See HUD, ONE STRIKE AND YOU’RE OUT, supra note 9; see also Kropf, supra note 59,
at 86; Morris, supra note 34, at 164-66 (providing a summary of the Quality Housing and
Work Responsibility Act (“QHWRA”), the final statutory amendments to the “One Strike”
policy).
62. See Kropf, supra note 59, at 78.
63. Id. at 87.
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Incarceration, Segregation, and Poverty Today

“Two hundred fifty years of slavery. Ninety years of Jim Crow. Sixty years
of separate but equal. Thirty-five years of racist housing policy. Until we
reckon with our compounding moral debts, America will never be whole.”64
Today, the criminal justice system is defined by over-criminalization,
over-punishment, and discriminatory policing and prosecuting.65 As a result,
federal prisons and state jails are filled beyond capacity, with people of color
overrepresented.66 Upon conviction, incarcerated persons are burdened with
“collateral consequences”—indirect penalties imposed by state and federal
statutes that disadvantage and deny them political, social, and economic
rights and privileges that most Americans consider to be fundamental and
intrinsic components of citizenship.67 Consequently, these individuals are
“shackled with the stigma of their prison record long after serving time
behind bars,”68 which makes housing and employment difficult to obtain.69
Also today, neighborhoods, towns, and cities remain deeply segregated.70
Many neighborhoods with high concentrations of poverty are comprised
predominately of people of color.71 Some of these individuals are stuck in a
cycle of poverty and recidivism: “[w]hen individuals are economically
impoverished, they are more likely to not only offend, but also repeatedly
offend, because poverty compounded with the imposed civil disabilities of a

64. Coates, supra note 9.
65. See Newman, supra note 37, at 134.
66. See supra Part I.
67. See Adrienne Lyles-Chockley, Transitions to Justice: Prisoner Reentry as an
Opportunity to Confront and Counteract Racism, 6 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 259, 267
(2009) (explaining that these penalties can affect parental rights; voting rights; jury service;
employment; licensing; driver’s licenses and passports; educational grants, loans and work
assistance; federal welfare benefits; and public housing); see also, Etienne C. Toussaint,
Incarceration to Incorporation: Economic Empowerment for Returning Citizens Through
Social Impact Bonds, 25 J. AFFORD. HOUS. & CMTY. DEV. L. 61, 64 (2016) (“Not only does
America’s criminal justice system overwhelmingly target young Black men in low-income
communities as the primary perpetrators of criminal activity, but it also routinely relegates
them to second-class citizenship upon their release from prison.”).
68. Toussaint, supra note 67, at 64.
69. See Ta-Nehisi Coates, The Black Family in the Age of Mass Incarceration, ATLANTIC
(Oct. 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/10/the-black-family-in-theage-of-mass-incarceration/403246/ [https://perma.cc/F2RN-JE5W] (“Our carceral state
banishes American citizens to a gray wasteland far beyond the promises and protections the
government grants its other citizens. Banishment continues long after one’s actual time
behind bars has ended, making housing and employment hard to secure.”).
70. See Matthew Bloch et al., Mapping Segregation, N.Y. TIMES (July 8, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/07/08/us/census-race-map.html
[https://perma.cc/3D3S-VUFC].
71. See, e.g., Poverty Data Tool, N.Y.C. CTR. FOR ECON. OPPORTUNITY,
http://www.nyc.gov/html/ceo/html/poverty/lookup.shtml [https://perma.cc/LKH8-JDZM].
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criminal conviction further socially isolate and minimize their life
options.”72
B.

The Importance of Reducing Recidivism

Reducing recidivism is an important goal of many municipalities for both
social and economic reasons.73 An average of roughly 650,000 people are
released from federal and state prisons annually, and 11.4 million cycle in
and out of local jails annually.74 An estimated forty to fifty percent of people
released from prison are re-incarcerated within three years of their release.75
Recidivism, coupled with a growing incarceration rate has resulted in huge
correctional expenses born by the states: in recent years, annual correctional
expenses have surpassed fifty billion dollars.76
From a social perspective, reducing recidivism can create safer
communities and promote long-term public safety goals.77 Reducing
recidivism helps both the communities in which formerly incarcerated
people typically live in, and their family members who they often
disproportionately rely on for support.78 Programs to reduce recidivism can
act as a means to confront and counteract racism and bring about social
justice.79 From an economic perspective, reducing the number of
incarcerated people reduces the cost states and municipalities spend on

72. See Alina Ball, Comment, An Imperative Redefinition of “Community”:
Incorporating Reentry Lawyers to Increase The Efficacy of Community Economic
Development Initiatives, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1883, 1883 (2008); see also Lyles-Chockley,
supra note 67, at 263 n.29 (“[T]he exit and reentry of prison inmates is geographically
concentrated in America’s poorest minority neighborhoods.”) (citing Todd R. Clear, The
Problem with “Addition by Subtraction”: The Prison-Crime Relationship in Low-Income
Communities, in INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS
IMPRISONMENT 181, 184 (Marc Mauer & Meda Chesney-Lind eds., 2002)).
73. See Report: 17 States Reduce Recidivism, Save Billions by Reinvesting Wisely,
PRISON LEGAL NEWS (Jan. 13, 2015), https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2015/jan/13/
report-17-states-reduce-recidivism-save-billions-reinvesting-wisely/ [https://perma.cc/5F4TYT9K].
74. See HUD GUIDANCE 2016, supra note 2, at 1; Wagner & Rabuy, supra note 30.
75. See Fontaine & Biess, supra note 8, at 1.
76. See id. (“[A] handful of states spend more discretionary dollars on corrections than
higher education.”) (internal citations omitted).
77. See Recidivism Reduction Checklist–Executive and Legislative Policymakers, CSG
JUST. CTR,
https://csgjusticecenter.org/reentry/legislative-and-executive-policymakers/
[https://perma.cc/57PA-3P7T].
78. Fontaine & Biess, supra note 8, at 1; see also Ben Geiger, Comment, The Case for
Treating Ex-Offenders as a Suspect Class, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1191, 1196-97 (2006) (“Since exoffenders are often important breadwinners, their innocent families and relatives also
suffer . . . . [o]n top of the significant expense of supporting an inmate, then, inmates’ families
face a loss of income. Similarly, since poor communities of color receive a disproportionately
high number of ex-offenders, these communities have even fewer resources for rehabilitation
per ex-offender.”) (internal citations omitted).
79. See Lyles-Chockley, supra note 67, at 259.
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corrections.80 Many municipalities, aware of this cost savings, track
recidivism rates by setting targets and implementing proven programs81 to
curb recidivism.82
Despite efforts currently undertaken by many states, the recidivism
problem still persists.83 Many state policies designed to reduce recidivism
focus on helping formerly incarcerated people obtain jobs.84 However,
overcoming barriers to housing is arguably one of, if not the most important
step in reducing recidivism and ending the cycle of poverty and
homelessness.85 Housing stability is the “lynchpin that holds the
reintegration process together.”86
C.

The Intersection of Homelessness and Incarceration

Residential instability and homelessness are two of the greatest challenges
formerly incarcerated people face that limit their chances of successful
reentry.87 Roughly one out of ten people who become incarcerated have
experienced homelessness in their lifetime prior to prison, and one out of ten
who leave prison will experience homelessness in the future.88
Approximately twenty percent of single homeless adults have served time,
and this number is even higher in urban areas.89 For example, in New York

80. See PRISON LEGAL NEWS, supra note 73.
81. For example, the N.Y.C. FUSE Initiative is one such program. See Adala et al., infra
note 97 and accompanying text.
82. See, e.g., March Schabses, Criminal Justice Technical Report, N.Y. DIV. OF CRIM.
JUST. SERVS. 3 (Oct. 2013), http://www.criminaljustice.ny.gov/crimnet/ojsa/resultsfirst/rftechnical_report_cba1_oct2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/DZT2-F47X].
83. See Toussaint, supra note 67, at 65.
84. See Joseph Fishkin, The Anti-Bottleneck Principle in Employment Discrimination
Law, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 1429, 1458 (2014) (“Employment became a central focus of a loose
‘re-entry movement’ that joined activists and policymakers interested in helping prisoners reintegrate into their communities.”) (internal citations omitted).
85. See Fontaine & Biess, supra note 8, at 1, 5.
86. JEREMY TRAVIS, BUT THEY ALL COME BACK: FACING THE CHALLENGES OF PRISONER
REENTRY 219 (2005) (quoting Katharine H. Bradley et al., No Place Like Home: Housing
and the Ex- Prisoner, CMTY. RES. FOR JUST. (2001), http://b.3cdn.net/crjustice/a5b5d8
fa98ed957505_hqm6b5qp2.pdf [https://perma.cc/FRB8-LZ2H]).
87. Faith E. Lutze et al., Homelessness and Reentry: A Multistate Outcome Evaluation
of Washington State’s Reentry Housing Program for High Risk Offenders, 41 CRIM. JUST. &
BEHAV. 471, 472 (2014).
88. See Marie Claire Tran-Leung, When Discretion Means Denial: A National
Perspective on Criminal Records Barriers to Federally Subsidized Housing, SHRIVER CTR. 2
(2015), http://www.povertylaw.org/files/docs/WDMD-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/9U264W8F] (citing Stephen Metraux et al., Incarceration And Homelessness 9-5 (2007),
https://www.huduser.gov/publications/pdf/p9.pdf [https://perma.cc/N58L-SX5F]; Caterina
Gouvis Roman & Jeremy Travis, Taking Stock: Housing, Homelessness and Prisoner
Reentry, URB. INST. 7-8 (2004), http://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/alfresco/publicationpdfs/411096-Taking-Stock.PDF [https://perma.cc/EF9G-QDVT]).
89. See Tran-Leung, supra note 88, at 2.
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City about one-third of single adults in shelters have been recently released
from local jails.90 Access to safe and stable housing is critical to successful
reentry, making one less likely to recidivate.91 One study demonstrated that
the chances of recidivism were doubled for those who lacked adequate
housing.92 Further, a comprehensive analysis of a Washington state
program,93 which aims to reduce recidivism by providing high-risk formerly
incarcerated persons94 with one year of housing support, proved to be
successful: the rates of new offenses and recidivism were significantly
reduced.95 This study further recommended that subsidized housing for high
risk formerly incarcerated persons be a “central part of coordinated responses
to reentry.”96 Similarly, New York City’s “FUSE” Initiative97 has also
achieved success in reducing recidivism of high-risk formerly incarcerated
people by collaborating with ten non-profits and various City agencies to
provide supportive housing.98
Access to stable housing provides formerly incarcerated people with a
platform upon which they can begin to focus on reintegrating, whether that
be finding a job, obtaining treatment for mental health or drug addiction,
90. See id. (citing N.Y. State Bar Assoc. Special Comm. on Collateral Consequences of
Criminal Proceedings, Re-Entry and Reintegration: The Road to Public Safety 219 (May
2006), http://www.nysba.org/Workarea/Downloadasset.aspx?Id=26857 [https://perma.cc/
54JR-47SH]) (explaining this figure is substantially higher if prisons are also included).
91. See Tran-Leung, supra note 88, at 2 (citing Julian M. Somers et al., Housing First
Reduces Re-Offending Among Formerly Homeless Adults with Mental Disorders: Results of
a Randomized Controlled Trial, PLOS ONE 1, 6-7 (Sept. 2013), http://journals.
plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0072946 [https://perma.cc/8QCX-5ZJQ]);
see also Michael G. Allen, et al., Assessing HUD’s Disparate Impact Rule: A Practitioner’s
Perspective, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 155, 192 (2014) (“[A]n individual’s inability to find
stable, affordable housing upon release from prison contributes dramatically to recidivism.”).
92. Tran-Leung, supra note 88, at 2 (citing Lornet Turnbull, Few Rentals for Freed
Felons, SEATTLE TIMES (Nov. 29, 2010, 10:09 PM), http://o.seattletimes.nwsource.com/
html/localnews/2013552561_housing30m.html [https://perma.cc/R5ZA-J7PC]).
93. The program is called the “Reentry Housing Pilot Program (RHPP).” Lutze et al.,
supra note 87, at 471.
94. High-risk generally refers to individuals who have cycled in and out of jail or prison
and in and out of homelessness multiple times in their lives.
95. See Lutze et al., supra note 87, at 471.
96. Id.
97. “Frequent Users Service Enhancement.” Angela A. Adala et al., New York City FUSE
II Evaluation Report, COLUM. U. MAILMAN SCH. OF PUB. HEALTH i, http://www.csh.org/wpcontent/uploads/2014/01/FUSE-Eval-Report-Final_Linked.pdf
[https://perma.cc/C6C6XB5Y].
98. See id. (This is a “collaboration between the Corporation for Supportive Housing; The
New York City Departments of Homeless Services, Correction, Health and Mental Hygiene,
and Housing Preservation and Development; The New York City Housing Authority; and ten
non-profit providers of housing and services. FUSE provided supportive housing to roughly
200 individuals who were frequently cycling in and out of jails and homeless shelters . . . .
supportive housing significantly improved their lives by reducing their cycling between public
systems, their days spent in jail and shelter and their use of crisis health services.”).
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rebuilding a social network, or reconnecting with their community and
family.99 Housing for formerly incarcerated people can serve a larger
purpose beyond mere shelter: “it can also serve as the literal and figurative
foundation for successful reentry and reintegration for released adults.”100
D.

Forms of Housing Discrimination Formerly Incarcerated People
Face

“Providing an effective second chance for folks with criminal justice
involvement starts with housing . . . . You can’t rejoin a community without
access to housing. And you can’t reconnect a family without a home in which
to do so.”101
Formerly incarcerated people ideally have five housing options when
released from prison: private housing; federally subsidized housing;
supportive housing; community correctional facilities or halfway houses;
and homeless shelters.102 Yet, formerly incarcerated people face barriers to
accessing housing options “regardless of their level of self-sufficiency and
employment prospects.”103
In the private housing market, formerly incarcerated people face an
economic barrier: the inability to afford to buy or rent in the private housing
market.104 Formerly incarcerated people also face a discrimination barrier:
landlords routinely conduct background checks and reject those with

99. See Lutze et al., supra note 87, at 472-73.
100. Fontaine & Biess, supra note 8, at 3 (“Quite simply, individuals released from prisons
and jails need to secure a place to sleep on their very first night out of the correctional
institution. For many, they return to their communities having only temporary housing
arrangements; therefore, their initial housing placement in the community is nothing more
than a “landing spot” or temporary destination.”) (internal citations omitted). See also id. at 5
(“The provision of short- and long-term housing for individuals targeted to their level of need
could be the key to successful reentry.”).
101. Statement by Tonya Robinson, Acting General Counsel, HUD. See Sargent Shriver
National Center on Poverty Law, Ensuring Fair Housing for People with Criminal Records:
A Conversation with HUD, Webinar & Presentation (Oct. 26, 2016), [hereinafter A
Conversation with HUD] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=y4tTiGgOky8 [https://perma.
cc/XUP6-FA4N].
102. See Fontaine & Biess, supra note 8 at 5-6.
103. Id. at 5.
104. See NAT’L HOUS. L. PROJECT, The Importance of Stable Housing for Formerly
Incarcerated Individuals, 40 HOUS. L. BULL. 60, 60 (2010), https://www.nhlp.org/files/
NHLP%20Bull%20Feb10_FINAL-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/D874-5BAG] [hereinafter NHLP
BULLETIN].
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criminal histories,105 further limiting their ability to obtain housing in the
private market.106
Formerly incarcerated people have difficulty obtaining federally
subsidized housing units due to long wait lists, lotteries, and overly
restrictive criminal history policies.107 The Sargent Shriver National Center
on Poverty Law has identified four rationales for why these criminal history
policies are overly restrictive: (1) “unreasonable lookback periods;”108 (2)
“use of arrests to prove criminal activity;”109 (3) “overbroad categories of
criminal activity;”110 and (4) “underuse of mitigating circumstances.”111
HUD, and even some states, have begun to regulate these policies in an
attempt to mitigate their discriminatory effects.112
Formerly incarcerated people also face challenges in finding supportive
housing. While supportive housing options exist,113 these programs have

105. Landlords have historically defined “criminal history” to include arrests where there
was no conviction. In the past several years HUD has made clear this is not permissible, yet
the practice still continues in many instances. See generally Tran-Leung, supra note 88
(explaining that landlords will reject people with criminal histories, regardless of the severity
of the crime, mitigating circumstances, how long ago it occurred, or the positive behavior and
rehabilitation exhibited years after the crime).
106. Fontaine & Biess, supra note 8, at 6-7.
107. See id.
108. Tran-Leung, supra note 88, at V (“Although HUD has suggested that five years is a
reasonable lookback period for serious crimes, some PHAs are looking back seven, ten, and
even twenty years for a wide variety of crimes . . . . even where admissions policies set forth
seemingly reasonable lookback periods, they are often inconsistent in terms of which of the
following events triggers the denial: (i) when the applicant engaged in the criminal activity;
(ii) when the applicant was arrested; (iii) when the applicant was convicted; or (iv) when the
applicant was released from incarceration or other correctional supervision.”).
109. Id. at VI (“[I]nstead of determining whether criminal activity took place, many
housing providers treat a criminal arrest the same as criminal activity, even if the applicant
was never convicted of the underlying offense.”).
110. Id. at VIII-IX (Federal law allows PHAs to design policies that relate to “drug-related
criminal activity, violent criminal activity, and criminal activity that pose a threat to the health,
safety, and welfare of other residents.” However, PHAs commonly ban applicants with any
past felony charges, including those charged with littering, shoplifting, or failure to pay a
fine.).
111. Id. at X (Federal law requires PHAs to give consideration to mitigating circumstances,
but some policies lack any reference to this requirement, and as a result “formerly incarcerated
individuals knew about their local PHAs’ screening criteria, but they did not know that they
could appeal the denial of their application.”).
112. See infra Section I.F.
113. See Fontaine & Biess, supra note 8, at 7-8 (“[S]upportive housing is an effective
platform for individuals with histories of chronic residential instability, mental illness, and
institutional cycling . . . . studies on supportive housing seem to suggest that supportive
housing can reduce service use among formerly incarcerated persons with extensive histories
of homelessness and incarceration.”).
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limited spots available,114 and when new developments are proposed many
communities react with “not in my backyard” (“NIMBY”) attitudes.115 Such
attitudes, and the resulting campaigns against proposed developments
contribute to the lack of available services and housing stock for formerly
incarcerated persons upon their release.116
Furthermore, there are not enough governmental services such as
community correctional facilities or halfway houses available to recently
released individuals, and most states do not implement housing plans for
recently un-incarcerated persons.117 The communities of recently released
individuals are also ill-equipped; most communities generally have a
shortage of affordable housing stock.118 As a result, formerly incarcerated
people may end up in unstable arrangements, or their families must bear the
cost of housing them.119
Lastly, shelters are not a viable option for all formerly incarcerated people.
For example, some individuals chose to remain on the streets rather than stay
in a shelter due to stories they have heard or experiences they have had in
dangerous and unsanitary shelters: “you hear a lot of terrible things about
shelters, that shelters are dangerous places, that they’re full of drugs and drug
dealers, that people will steal your shoes, and there’s bedbugs and body lice.
And yeah, unfortunately a lot of those things are true.”120 Additionally,

114. For example, the Fortune Society in New York City has helped hundreds of formerly
incarcerated people, and operates two facilities; however, they have limited space, offering
sixty-two beds for emergency and transitional housing. See Terrance Ross, Fortune Society
Halfway House Marks 10 Yrs. Helping Ex-Inmates, Homeless in Harlem, N.Y. Daily News
(June 21, 2012, 2:47 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/manhattan/fortunesociety-halfway-house-marks-10-yrs-helping-ex-inmates-homeless-harlem-article1.1099476 [https://perma.cc/9N54-9KB7].
115. See Tran-Leung, supra note 88, at 8.
116. See id. at 6.
117. See Fontaine & Biess, supra note 8, at 7.
118. See id. at 8 (“[R]esearch has shown that released prisoners disproportionately return
to a few, often clustered, neighborhoods with high social and economic disadvantage and low
institutional investment. This is problematic because released prisoners who return to these
disadvantaged neighborhoods have a higher risk of reoffending than those who do not return
to such neighborhoods.”) (internal citations omitted).
119. See id. at 9 (“[R]esiding on one’s own instead of relying on family and friends for
housing is related to lower recidivism rates among released prisoners in Illinois.”). But c.f. id.
at 8 (“The location of the housing unit—particularly if it is in a neighborhood that differs from
where the released prisoner was living before prison—may also afford adults the opportunity
to separate themselves from the former social networks and opportunities that originally
contributed to their criminal activity . . . those who return to a different neighborhood than the
one where they were arrested are less likely to recidivate than those who return to their old
neighborhood.”) (internal citations omitted).
120. Interview with David Pirtle, James Greene, & Kathy Sibert (Dec. 6, 2012),
http://www.npr.org/2012/12/06/166666265/why-some-homeless-choose-the-streets-overshelters [https://perma.cc/L3K8-BTRX].
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similar to supportive housing, many residents oppose the construction of
shelters in their neighborhoods, thwarting the creation of newer, less
crowded, and likely safer facilities.121
E.

HUD Guidance and the Fair Housing Act: The Litigation Regime

Due to the difficulties facing the formerly incarcerated—systemic racism,
residential segregation, homelessness, and harsh federal policies—HUD has
taken a more active role in addressing their needs. In the last several years,
HUD has attempted to foster more fairness in the use of criminal records in
housing decisions. In 2011, the then Secretary of HUD, Shaun Donovan, in
a series of letters to PHA executive directors, indicated that second chances
are important: formerly incarcerated people need support in “gain[ing]
access to one of the most fundamental building blocks of a stable life—a
place to live.”122 Donovan highlighted that HUD only imposes mandatory
housing bans for two categories of former offenders: (1) those convicted of
manufacturing methamphetamine; and (2) registered sex offenders for
life.123 All other mandatory bans are temporary,124 and denying housing is
not mandatory in most cases.125
In 2013, HUD codified a three-part test to prove disparate impact and
establish liability under the FHA.126 The FHA bars discrimination against
“any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a
121. See, e.g., Emma Whitford, Outraged Queens Residents Shout Down Homeless Shelter
Proposal at Packed Meeting, GOTHAMIST (Sept. 1, 2016, 9:42 AM), http://gothamist.com/
2016/09/01/maspeth_homeless_shelter.php [https://perma.cc/LHC4-5YW9].
122. Letter from Shaun Donovan, Secretary, HUD, to Public Housing Authority Executive
Directors (June 17, 2011), [hereinafter Donovan Letter 1] http://nhlp.org/files/Rentry%
20letter%20from%20Donovan%20to%20PHAs%206-17-11.pdf
[https://perma.cc/K7JBZAYS]; Letter from Shaun Donovan, Secretary, HUD (Mar. 14, 2012), http://nhlp.org/files/
HUD%20Letter%203.14.12.pdf [hereinafter Donovan Letter 2] [https://perma.cc/YLV45RTB].
123. See Donovan Letter 1, supra note 122; 42 U.S.C. § 1437n(f)(1) (2012), 42 U.S.C.
§ 13663(a) (2015); 24 C.F.R. §§ 960.204, 982.553 (2012).
124. See 42 U.S.C. § 13661 (2012); see also 24 C.F.R. §§ 982.553, 960.204(a)(2)(i)-(ii)
(2012); Public Housing Occupancy Guidebook, HUD 73 (June 2003), [hereinafter Pub. Hous.
Guidebook]
https://www.hud.gov/offices/pih/programs/ph/rhiip/phguidebooknew.pdf
[https://perma.cc/L6WP-7MHP]; see also Tran-Leung, supra note 88, at 7 (The temporary
drug-related eviction ban requires “PHAs and project owners [to] determine whether an
applicant has ever been evicted from federally assisted housing for drug-related criminal
activity. If such an eviction took place in the past three years, the applicant must be
denied . . . . If, however, the eviction took place more than three years prior to the application,
the PHA or project owner has the discretion to admit the applicant.”).
125. See 42 U.S.C. § 13661(c) (2012); 24 C.F.R. § 5.100 (2012); 24 CFR 982.553 (2012);
Pub. Hous. Guidebook, supra note 124; see also Geiger, supra note 78, at 1204 (explaining
that PHAs and project owners may reject applicants who have engaged in drug-related
criminal activity or violent criminal activity, or “other criminal activity that would adversely
affect the health, safety or right to peaceful enjoyment of the premises by other residents”).
126. See 24 C.F.R. § 100.500.
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dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith,
because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.”127
Under this regulation, “a practice has a discriminatory effect where it
actually or predictably results in a disparate impact on a group of persons or
creates, increases, reinforces, or perpetuates segregated housing patterns
because of [protected class status].”128 In 2015, HUD issued guidance to
PHAs and owners of federally assisted housing clarifying that arrest records
alone could not be used as the basis for terminating assistance, evicting
tenants, or denying admission to federally subsidized housing.129
That same year, the Supreme Court in Texas v. Inclusive Communities
recognized the disparate impact theory and prescribed certain
“safeguards”130 based on its interpretation of the FHA.131 In April 2016,
soon after the Court’s decision, HUD further clarified FHA standards on the
use of criminal histories.132 This HUD guidance explained that due to the
disproportionate number of people of color who have been involved in the
criminal justice system, a housing provider with a policy that denies formerly
incarcerated persons housing may be violating the FHA.133 Specifically the
guidance noted, “[w]hile having a criminal record is not a protected
characteristic under the Fair Housing Act, criminal history-based restrictions
on housing opportunities violate the Act if, without justification, their burden
falls more often on renters or other housing market participants of one race
or national origin over another.”134 The 2016 guidance details and clarifies
the three-step process first established in 2013 for reviewing a claim of
discriminatory effect, which must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.135

127. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b).
128. 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(a).
129. See HUD GUIDANCE 2015, supra note 16 and accompanying text.
130. See infra notes 145-149 and accompanying text.
131. See Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct.
2507, 2525 (2015) (“The Court holds that disparate-impact claims are cognizable under the
Fair Housing Act upon considering its results-oriented language, the Court’s interpretation of
similar language in Title VII and the ADEA, Congress’ ratification of disparate-impact claims
in 1988 against the backdrop of the unanimous view of nine Courts of Appeals, and the
statutory purpose.”).
132. See HUD GUIDANCE 2016, supra note 2.
133. See id. at 2. Importantly, this policy does not create new standards or requirements,
but rather, clarifies how existing standards apply. See id.
134. Id. at 2; see id. at 8 (explaining that intentional discrimination, when a housing
provider treats applicants with substantially similar criminal histories unequally based on a
protected characteristic, is also prohibited).
135. See id. (explaining that there is one exception (§ 807(b)(4)) under the statute to
liability for a disparate impact claim: housing providers can deny housing to those who have
been convicted of manufacturing or distributing drugs).
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The first step requires the plaintiff (or the “charging party” in a HUD
administrative action)136 prove that the criminal history policy has a
disparate impact on a particular group due to their race or national origin.137
The plaintiff can satisfy the burden of proof in step one by presenting
evidence that shows the practice actually or predictably results in a disparate
impact.138 The plaintiff may use evidence such as housing applicant data,
tenant files, census demographic data and localized criminal justice data.139
If the plaintiff satisfies the burden of proof, the second step then shifts the
burden to the housing provider to prove that the criminal history policy is
necessary to achieve a substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory interest—
that the policy is justified.140 The interest of the housing provider must be
proven with evidence that is not hypothetical or speculative.141 While
protecting property and the safety of other residents is considered substantial
and legitimate, “[b]ald assertions based on generalizations or stereotypes that
any individual with an arrest or conviction record poses a greater risk than
any other individual without such a record are not sufficient to satisfy this
burden.”142 If the housing provider meets this burden, the third step requires
the plaintiff to prove that the interest of the policy could be achieved by a
less discriminatory alternative.143 A less discriminatory alternative often is
one that involves an individualized assessment of the applicant beyond what
is in the criminal record.144

136. See 24 C.F.R. § 100.500 (explaining that plaintiffs may bring private actions against
landlords in a federal proceeding (see 42 U.S.C. § 3613, 42 U.S.C. § 3614), or the charging
party may bring an administrative action to be tried before HUD administrative law judges
(see 42 U.S.C. § 3612)).
137. See HUD GUIDANCE 2016, supra note 2, at 3.
138. See id.
139. See id. at 3-4.
140. See id. at 4.
141. See id.
142. Id. at 5-6. A policy or practice of excluding individuals due to one or more prior
arrests (without any conviction) or a policy that imposes a blanket prohibition on any person
with any conviction record will fail this burden. Moreover, a policy that fails to take into
account when the conviction occurred, the underlying conduct, the actions of the convicted
person since, the nature and severity of the conviction, and the amount of time that has passed
is also unlikely to satisfy this burden.
143. See id. at 7.
144. See id. at 7 (“Relevant individualized evidence might include: the facts or
circumstances surrounding the criminal conduct; the age of the individual at the time of the
conduct; evidence that the individual has maintained a good tenant history before and/or after
the conviction or conduct; and evidence of rehabilitation efforts. By delaying consideration
of criminal history until after an individual’s financial and other qualifications are verified, a
housing provider may be able to minimize any additional costs that such individualized
assessment might add to the applicant screening process.”); see also Tex. Dep’t of Hous. &
Cmty Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2549 (2015) (Alito, J.,
dissenting) (These HUD regulations and “the Court’s pronouncements are so hazy, courts—
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Importantly, in Texas v. Inclusive Communities, the Supreme Court
limited the scope of a disparate impact claim “to protect potential defendants
against abusive disparate-impact claims.”145 First, while the Court held that
plaintiffs can use statistics to illustrate the discriminatory effect, it
established a robust causality requirement: liability is not found solely on
the bases of “statistical disparity.”146 There must be a causal connection
between the challenged policy and the alleged disparities to prevent racebased considerations from being introduced into every housing decision.147
Second, the justification for the policy provided by the defendant is “not
contrary to the disparate-impact requirement, unless . . . artificial, arbitrary,
and unnecessary.”148 Third, any “remedial orders” issued by a court must
“concentrate on the elimination of the offending practice” through “raceneutral means.”149
Overall, the Texas v. Inclusive Communities ruling is in tension with the
HUD 2016 guidance and 2013 regulation. There are several key differences
between the Supreme Court’s use of disparate impact and HUD’s. First, the
limitations described above are absent from HUD’s 2013 regulation and
2016 guidance: the “robust causality requirement” established by the
Supreme Court arguably creates a higher burden of proof for a plaintiff to
meet in a private action, whereas HUD’s guidance provides greater
discretion in investigating complaints.150
Second, the Supreme Court’s language in describing the housing
provider’s justification differs from that in HUD’s 2013 regulation. HUD
calls for the housing provider to furnish a “legally sufficient justification”
that is “necessary to achieve one or more substantial, legitimate,
nondiscriminatory interests,” which “could not be served by another practice

lacking expertise in the field of housing policy—may inadvertently harm the very people that
the FHA is meant to help . . . . Congress did not intend to engage the federal courts in an
endless exercise of second-guessing local programs.”) (internal citations and quotations
omitted).
145. Tex. v. Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2524.
146. Id. at 2512.
147. See id. at 2524.
148. Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted); see Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
149. Tex. v. Inclusive Cmyts., 135 S. Ct. at 2524 (“If additional measures are adopted,
courts should strive to design them to eliminate racial disparities through race-neutral
means.”) (internal citations omitted); see also Fair Housing Act—Disparate Impact and
Racial Equality—Texas Department of Housing & Community Affairs v. Inclusive
Communities Project, Inc., 129 HARV. L. REV. 321, 328 (2015) (“Justice Kennedy’s concern
for facial neutrality evinces a commitment to understanding and deconstructing race as a
social concept perpetuated by the law.”).
150. Compare Tex. v. Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. 2507, with HUD GUIDANCE 2016, supra
note 2, at 3 (“National statistics provide grounds for HUD to investigate complaints
challenging criminal history policies.”).
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that has a less discriminatory effect.”151 The Court uses the term “valid
interest” which may call for a lower standard of proof and could be more
favorable to defendants.152 The Court did not elaborate on this point, and
whether the Court intended to lower the standard of proof is an open question
for future litigation.153
These differences between the HUD 2013 regulation and 2016 guidance,
and the Texas v. Inclusive Communities decision may lead to potentially
conflicting outcomes in the future depending on the nature of the action. For
example, in an administrative action, HUD will likely enjoy more discretion
in determining whether a policy results in disparate impact liability154—
assuming its 2016 guidance remains unchallenged.155 In contrast, when a
case is brought in the courts, the plaintiff will likely have more difficulty
satisfying her burden due to the additional “safeguards” detailed in Texas v.
Inclusive Communities.156
In response to the HUD guidance and Texas v. Inclusive Communities
decision, several states have become significantly active in addressing
criminal history screening policies.157
151. 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(b).
152. See William E. Taibl, Fair Housing Act and Disparate-Impact – Is There a Bit of a
Silver Lining in the Dark Cloud of a Recent U.S. Supreme Court Decision?, NAT’L L. R.
(2015), http://www.natlawreview.com/print/article/fair-housing-act-and-disparate-impactthere-bit-silver-lining-dark-cloud-recent-us-s [https://perma.cc/K7MY-2AFZ]; see also
Samuel R. Bagenstos, Disparate Impact and the Role of Classification and Motivation in
Equal Protection Law After Inclusive Communities, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 1115, 1141 (2016)
(“[T]he Court’s ‘valid interest’ language will doubtless cause confusion and disagreement.”).
The HUD 2016 Guidance makes no mention of this subtle difference: It restates the language
in 24 C.F.R. 100.500 and also cites to Texas v. Inclusive Communities for support. See HUD
GUIDANCE 2016, supra note 2.
153. See Bagenstos, supra note 152, at 1141 (“Whether the opinion effects a meaningful
weakening of the burden of justifying practices with a disparate impact will only become
apparent with time.”).
154. HUD administrative judges will likely follow HUD regulations and guidance, absent
from which are the limitations imposed by the Court. See Taibl, supra note 152; Tex. v.
Inclusive Cmtys., 135 S. Ct. at 2549 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“The effect of these regulations,
not surprisingly, is to confer enormous discretion on HUD—without actually solving the
problem. What is a ‘substantial’ interest? Is there a difference between a ‘legitimate’ interest
and a ‘nondiscriminatory’ interest? To what degree must an interest be met for a practice to
be ‘necessary’? How are parties and courts to measure ‘discriminatory effect’?”).
155. New litigation brought in the courts may lead to a challenge of the recent 2016
guidance as overstepping constitutional limits by being overly broad when failing to mention
the “safeguards” established in Texas v. Inclusive Communities, and thus being inconsistent
with the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the FHA. See infra Section II.A.
156. See Amy M. Glassman & Shanellah Verna, Disparate Impact One Year After
Inclusive Communities, 25 J. AFFORD. HOUS. & CMTY. DEV. L. 11, 12 (2016) (“Although there
have been a range of disparate impact claims since ICP, our review of those cases suggests
that the guidance of the ICP case is creating difficulty for many plaintiffs to make a prima
facie showing of disparate impact.”).
157. See infra Section I.F.
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State Action to Address Discrimination in Criminal History
Screening

Some states have taken the initiative to provide further guidance to
housing managers and owners regarding the permissible use of criminal
histories in housing policies. In April of 2016, New York State’s Division
of Housing and Community Renewal (“DHCR”) issued a memorandum
explaining and clarifying the new HUD guidance and how it applies to all
housing companies, owners, managing agents, and site managers in the
state.158 This memorandum requires housing companies that screen for
criminal histories to establish policies and standards by which an
individualized assessment is conducted, weighing factors such as: “(a)
seriousness of the crime, (b) the time elapsed since the offense, (c) the age
of the applicant at the time of the crime, (d) evidence of the applicant’s
rehabilitation and (e) whether they are an actual danger to their
neighbors.”159
DHCR issued further requirements specific to state-funded housing
providers. First, DHCR requires that these housing providers complete a
worksheet when reviewing an applicant with a criminal history.160 This
worksheet contains a series of questions that address the individualized
assessment factors described above.161 The worksheet serves two purposes:
(1) it creates a written record of the decision making process, allowing the
housing provider to make consistent decisions and the applicant to
understand the reasons for the decision;162 and (2) it ensures housing
providers consider all relevant factors when making their decision.163
Second, DHCR issued accompanying guidance to this worksheet to assist
state-funded housing providers.164 This guidance outlined general policies
for housing providers that detail how to conduct an individualized

158. See MEMORANDUM RE: ACCESS TO REDUCING HOUSING BARRIERS FOR NEW YORKERS
CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS, DHCR, (Apr. 20, 2016), http://www.nyshcr.org/AboutUs/
Offices/HousingOperations/2016-B-04.pdf [https://perma.cc/ML6V-APGX].
159. Id.
160. See WORKSHEET FOR APPLYING NEW YORK STATE’S ANTI-DISCRIMINATION POLICIES
WHEN ASSESSING APPLICANTS FOR STATE-FUNDED HOUSING WHO HAVE CRIMINAL
CONVICTIONS, DHCR (May 2016), [hereinafter NY CRIMINAL WORKSHEET]
http://www.nyshcr.org/AboutUs/Offices/FairHousing/GPCC_Worksheet.pdf
[https://perma.cc/F9C6-X4YU].
161. See id.
162. This also creates a record of evidence that may assist plaintiffs in ensuing litigation,
or unearth patterns of discrimination from particular housing providers.
163. See GUIDE FOR APPLYING NEW YORK STATE’S ANTI-DISCRIMINATION POLICIES WHEN
ASSESSING APPLICANTS FOR STATE-FUNDED HOUSING WHO HAVE CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS,
DHCR 2, (May 2016), [hereinafter DHCR 2016 GUIDE] http://www.nyshcr.org/AboutUs/
Offices/FairHousing/GPCC_Guidance_Document.pdf [https://perma.cc/4V24-MBMQ].
164. See id.
WITH
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assessment, specific requirements on how to maintain a record of all
applications, and an explanation of how to complete the worksheet and
appropriately consider the relevant factors.165
The Housing Authority of New Orleans (“HANO”) in March of 2016
amended its criminal background procedure, which used to ban housing
assistance to individuals with criminal records.166 HANO’s new policy
applies to HANO-managed public housing sites, third-party managed public
housing sites, and the Housing Choice Voucher Program (“HCVP”).167 The
policy explicitly states that “[t]here is absolutely no presumption that an
applicant with a criminal conviction should be denied housing assistance.
Before making a decision to admit or deny applicants with criminal
convictions, they shall be given an individualized review based on accurate
information, including notice and opportunity to be heard.”168 HANO
requires a two-step process that first assesses criminal convictions using
what they call “the Grid” (categories of crimes and lookback periods that
require further review); and second, conducts an individualized assessment
of applications who require further review.169
The screening process determines if an applicant is deemed eligible, or if
an applicant requires further review by referencing the Grid.170 Then the
further review is conducted by a three-person panel—two senior HANO
officials and a resident representative—established by HANO and each
manager.171 The panel is to consider, at a minimum, the number of
convictions, nature of convictions, time since release, rehabilitation,
community ties and support, and employment history of the individual.172
Importantly, applicants are notified in writing when further review is
necessary, and have the opportunity to “dispute the accuracy of the

165. See id. at 2-5.
166. See Richard Webster, HANO Approves New Criminal Background Check Policy,
TIMES-PICAYUNE (Mar. 29, 2016), http://www.nola.com/politics/index.ssf/2016/03/hano_
approves_new_criminal_bac.html [https://perma.cc/8CEP-VAGG].
167. See HANO CRIMINAL BACKGROUND SCREENING PROCEDURES 1 (Draft 2/5/2016),
[hereinafter HANO PROCEDURES] https://www.hano.org/home/agency_plans/CRIMINAL
%20BACKGROUND%20PROCEDURES%20FOR%20POSTING%2002.05.16.pdf
[https://perma.cc/W7CL-36UX].
168. Id.
169. See id.
170. See id. Technically, if a crime does not require further review, the applicant is deemed
eligible. However, all crime categories listed on the Grid require further review, but some
crimes are limited to a look-back period of three years from conviction and one year from
release. See A Conversation with HUD, supra note 101, at slide 23; see also HANO
PROCEDURES, supra note 167, at 2-3. However, these look-back periods are shorter than the
standard five to seven year lookback period. See A Conversation with HUD, supra note 101.
171. HANO PROCEDURES, supra note 167, at 5 (“HANO will coordinate with community
partners to develop and deliver the training [to panel members].”).
172. See id. at 6-8.
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conviction information” before the review is undertaken.173 If an applicant
is denied, she is entitled to appeal the decision but not the process.174 HANO
and managers must keep a record of every decision made, and every six
months HANO must publish a report on the further review process’ data and
outcomes.175
These state actions to clarify criminal history housing procedures and
enhance protections against discrimination for formerly incarcerated persons
are meaningful steps. However, it is important to note that these DHCR and
HANO procedures generally apply only to state-funded housing providers
and programs, not private housing providers.176
II. FRAMEWORKS FOR ADDRESSING HOUSING ISSUES FACED BY
FORMERLY INCARCERATED PEOPLE
Section II.A discusses the current disparate impact litigation regime, and
its inadequacies in addressing the issues formerly incarcerated individuals
face regarding access to stable, safe, affordable housing. Section II.B
explores the designation of protected class status for formerly incarcerated
individuals. The Section ultimately concludes that this solution is still rooted
in a litigation framework and is thus subject to the same problems.
Moreover, the feasibility of such a designation is questionable. Section II.C
examines the PFS model as a way to supplement the current disparate impact
litigation regime. The Section concludes the PFS model is the most viable
remedy for combatting the barriers formerly incarcerated people face in
securing housing.
A. The Disparate Impact Fix: The Current Model Does Not
Adequately Address Problems Faced by Formerly Incarcerated People
Disparate impact litigation alone is incapable of securing housing for, and
combatting the volume of housing discrimination against, formerly
incarcerated people for several reasons. While disparate impact liability is,
in theory, hugely beneficial for assisting formerly incarcerated people in
challenging discrimination, it falls short in practice.177 When Texas v.
173. Id. at 6.
174. See id. at 7.
175. See id. at 8.
176. See NY CRIMINAL WORKSHEET, supra note 160; HANO PROCEDURES, supra note 167;
see also NHLP BULLETIN, supra note 104, at 60 (“Private housing represents 97% of the total
housing stock in the United States.”).
177. This is not to say that disparate impact, in general, is not an important tool; it is a very
important “mechanism for fighting segregation by prohibiting housing practices that
inadvertently have a disproportionate effect on minority populations and perpetuate
residential segregation.” Cornelius J. Murray IV, Promoting “Inclusive Communities:” A
Modified Approach to Disparate Impact Under the Fair Housing Act, 75 LA. L. REV. 213, 236
(2014).
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Inclusive Communities was decided, advocates saw the decision as a
victory.178 At last, the Supreme Court recognized liability under the
disparate impact theory.179
However, in the past forty years, plaintiffs have had limited success when
litigating disparate impact claims under the FHA.180 Some scholars argued
that this lack of success was due to an unclear standard “as well as the
theory’s use as a ‘Plan B’ to disparate treatment claims.”181 Now, some
scholars argue that the Court’s imposition of significant limitations on
establishing such a prima facie case will pose significant barriers to the
commencement of these private actions.182 In fact, the first court to hear a
case183 under the Texas v. Inclusive Communities disparate impact
framework granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment because
the plaintiff failed to meet the pleading requirements.184 In the past year

178. See, e.g., Victory! Supreme Court Upholds Key Protections of Fair Housing Act,
LAMBDA LEGAL (June 2015), http://www.lambdalegal.org/blog/20160625_victory-fha
[https://perma.cc/JNX4-FB6N].
179. See Patterson, supra note 51, at 213.
180. See Murray IV, supra note 177, at 216 n.20 (citing Stacy E. Seicshnaydre, Is
Disparate Impact Having Any Impact? An Appellate Analysis of Forty Years of Disparate
Impact Claims Under the Fair Housing Act, 63 AM. U. L. REV. 357, 393 (2013) (“What is
abundantly clear when analyzing the FHA disparate impact case law over the past forty years
is that the appellate courts have had little difficulty disposing of all manner of disparate impact
claims under the FHA . . . . plaintiffs have received positive decisions in less than 20%, or
eighteen of the ninety-two FHA disparate impact claims considered on appeal.”)).
181. Murray IV, supra note 177, at 216 n.21, n.23 (citing Jennifer L. Peresie, Toward A
Coherent Test for Disparate Impact Discrimination, 84 IND. L.J. 773, 774-75 (2009); Stacy E.
Seicshnaydre, Is the Road to Disparate Impact Paved with Good Intentions?: Stuck on State
of Mind in Anti-Discrimination Law, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1141, 1148-49 (2007);
Seicshnaydre, supra note 180, at 393).
182. See S. Lamar Gardner, #Blacklivesmatter, Disparate-Impact, and the Property
Agenda, 43 S.U. L. REV. 321, 325 (2016) (“[S]uch a strong causality requirement significantly
reduces the number of persons who might be able to prevail under a disparate-impact housing
discrimination claim. This high bar, in turn, has the potential to shut down many legitimate
claims of housing discrimination in instances where the practices and policies of the defendant
are engineered so as to be particularly difficult to directly and strongly connect to the
discriminatory effect so produced.”); J. William Callison, Inclusive Communities:
Geographic Desegregation, Urban Revitalization, and Disparate Impact Under the Fair
Housing Act, 46 U. MEM. L. REV. 1039, 1051 (2016) (“[W]hile Inclusive Communities did not
eliminate disparate impact as a cause of action under the FHA, it severely limited the scope
of the theory and expanded the discretion of the policy-making defendant.”). See generally
Glassman & Verna, supra note 156, at 16-24 (providing an overview of current cases since
the IPC decision).
183. City of Los Angeles v. Wells Fargo & Co, No. 2:13-CV-09007, 2015 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 93451 (C.D. Cal. July 17, 2015).
184. See id. Plaintiff, Los Angeles, alleged that Wells Fargo engaged in patterns and
practices such as redlining and reverse redlining which resulted in both intentional and
disparate impact discrimination. See id. On summary judgment, the court ruled that Los
Angeles failed to state a prima facie case due to a lack of quantitative evidence supporting the
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since the Texas v. Inclusive Communities decision, several other disparate
impact cases have also faced real challenges meeting these pleading
requirements.185
Fortune Society, Inc. v. Sandcastle Towers Housing Development Fund
Corp.186 and Alexander v. Edgewood Management Corp.187 are two cases at
bar that are examining this framework as applied to formerly incarcerated
persons. Thus far, both have survived the more stringent pleading
requirements stage; however, both are only in the early stages of litigation.
In Fortune Society v. Sandcastle, Fortune Society challenged Sandcastle
Towers’ criminal history policy.188 Fortune Society alleged the policy
constitutes a blanket ban against those with felony records and thus violates
the FHA under the disparate impact theory as it disproportionality affects
people of color.189 Sandcastle Towers insisted there was no blanket ban,
citing a handful of approved applications of tenants with misdemeanors.190
Additionally, they claimed there was no disparate impact as people of color
comprised seventy percent of the building.191 They further asserted that
convicted criminals are not a protected class, and plaintiffs were
“impermissibly seeking to challenge the criminal justice system and the
alleged racial disparity therein indirectly by and through Defendants.”192
The United States filed a statement of interest which asserts that “[i]t is
blackletter law under both Title VII and the FHA that the absence of racial
disparities in the final results of a multi-step process—at the bottom line—

disparate impact claims, and the city’s failure to identify artificial, arbitrary, or unnecessary
policies of Wells Fargo that produced the disparate impact. See id.
185. See, e.g., Burbank Apartments Tenant Ass’n v. Kargman, 48 N.E. 3d 394 (Mass.
2016); Ellis v. City of Minneapolis, No. 14-CV-3045(SRN/SER), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
40750 (D. Minn. Mar. 28, 2016); Azam v. City of Columbia Heights, No. CV 14-1044
(JRT/BRT), 2016 WL 424966 (D. Minn. Feb. 3, 2016). But see Long Island Hous. Servs.,
Inc. v. Nassau Cty. Indus. Dev. Agency, No. 14-CV-3307, 2015 WL 7756122 (E.D.N.Y. Dec.
1, 2015); R.I. Comm’n for Hum. Rts. v. Graul, 120 F. Supp. 3d 110 (D.R.I. 2015).
186. 1:14-cv-6410 (E.D.N.Y.).
187. 1:15-cv-01140-RCL (D.D.C.).
188. 1:14-cv-6410.
189. See First Amended Complaint at 1-2, Dkt. No. 30, Fortune Soc’y v. Sandcastle; see
also Transcript for Motion Hearing at 20:13-15, Dkt. No. 66, Fortune Soc’y v. Sandcastle
(“But what the truth seeking function has produced is 35 emails that say in writing there is a
blanket ban. They say no criminal background.”).
190. See Answer at 11 ¶ 87, Dkt. No. 37, Fortune Soc’y v. Sandcastle; see also, United
States of America’s Statement of Interest at 3-4, Dkt. No. 102, Fortune Soc’y v. Sandcastle
(“Plaintiff also analyzed the Sandcastle’s accepted application files and found evidence of no
more than six accepted tenants with non-traffic-related criminal convictions in the past
decade.”).
191. See United States of America’s Statement of Interest, Dkt. No. 102 at 5, Fortune Soc’y
v. Sandcastle.
192. Answer at 11 ¶ 81, Dkt. No. 37, Fortune Soc’y v. Sandcastle.
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does not excuse discrimination at a particular step of the process.”193
Sandcastle Tower’s reply accused the United States of lacking impartiality
in their statement of interest, and alleged it resembles “an intervenor’s
memorandum of law.”194 Sandcastle Towers also asserted that the United
States analysis is “only relevant should this court factually determine a
blanket ban exists.”195 Sandcastle filed a letter to request a pre-motion
hearing regarding their anticipated motion to dismiss for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction, arguing that the Fortune Society lacked standing.196 No
pre-motion hearing was granted.197 Subsequently, the parties have submitted
supplemental briefing on this issue.198 Interestingly, Sandcastle’s recent
reply briefs reassert that formerly incarcerated people are not a protected
class, and that the Fortune Society lacks organizational standing.199 The
Fortune Society has requested oral arguments be heard on this issue.200 In
their opposition brief the Fortune Society argues, among other things, that it
does have organizational standing, and even if defendant’s views of the facts
were correct, they still would have standing because the defendant’s conduct
injured them.201 In its sur-reply, Fortune Society further asserts that
193. United States of America’s Statement of Interest at 11-12, Dkt. No. 102, Fortune
Soc’y v. Sandcastle (“Based on just such reasoning, a federal district court recently rejected
an attempt to defend against an FHA disparate impact challenge to a criminal records policy
based on the fact that the tenants at the complexes at issue were predominately (and, in one
case, exclusively) African-American.”) (citing Alexander v. Edgewood Mgmt. Corp., No.
1:15-cv-01140-RCL, 2016 WL 5957673, at *3 (D.D.C. July 25, 2016)); see also Betsey v.
Turtle Creek Assocs., 736 F.2d 983, 987-88 (4th Cir. 1984); Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S.
440, 456 (1982).
194. Brief in Response to the Submission of the United States of America at 1, Dkt. No.
106, Fortune Soc’y v. Sandcastle.
195. Id. at 2.
196. See Letter re: Pre-Motion Conference for Anticipated Motion to Dismiss, Dkt. No.
111, Fortune Soc’y v. Sandcastle.
197. See Order Denying Motion for Pre Motion Conference, Jan. 26, 2017, Fortune Soc’y
v. Sandcastle (1:14-cv-6410).
198. See Defendant’s Supplemental Brief in Support of Dismissal for Lack of Subject
Matter Jurisdiction, Dkt. No. 115, Fortune Soc’y v. Sandcastle (1:14-cv-6410); Plaintiff’s
Brief in Opposition to Defendants’ Supplemental Brief in Support of Dismissal of the Action
for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction, Dkt. No. 116, Fortune Soc’y v. Sandcastle (1:14-cv6410); Defendant’s Reply Supplemental Brief in Further Support of Dismissal of the Action
for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction, Dkt. No. 119, Fortune Soc’y v. Sandcastle (1:14-cv6410).
199. See Defendant’s Reply Supplemental Brief in Further Support of Dismissal of the
Action for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction, Dkt. No. 119, Fortune Soc’y v. Sandcastle
(1:14-cv-6410); see Defendant’s Brief in Response to Plaintiff’s Sur-Reply Brief Submitted
in Further Support of Dismissal of the Action for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction at 1,
Dkt. No. 125, Fortune Soc’y v. Sandcastle (1:14-cv-6410).
200. See Plaintiff’s Brief in Opposition to Defendants’ Supplemental Brief in Support of
Dismissal of the Action for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction at 1, Dkt. No. 116, Fortune
Soc’y v. Sandcastle (1:14-cv-6410).
201. See id. at 9-14, 19-25.
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defendants mischaracterize FHA standing requirements.202 The court has
not ruled on this issue as of yet.203
Alexander v. Edgewood involves a challenge to Edgewood Management’s
and Community Preservation Development’s criminal history policies under
the disparate impact theory.204 The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, and
argued that their building is comprised of almost one hundred percent people
of color and, thus, there is no statistical disparity and no disparate impact.205
In denying the motion,206 Judge Lamberth explained that “[i]n order to
prevail in a discriminatory impact case under Title VII, plaintiffs, members
of a discrete minority, are required to prove only that a given policy has a
discriminatory impact on them as individuals.”207 Thus, Mr. Alexander had
stated a prima facie case, and defendant’s broad criminal history policy may
violate HUD’s 2016 guidance.208 In their answer to the amended complaint,
defendants asserted affirmative defenses, including that the plaintiff’s
application was denied for legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons, and that the
guidelines the plaintiff seeks to enforce are beyond the legislative or
constitutional authority of one or more governmental and promulgating
entities.209 Most recently, the defendants filed a motion to sever arguing
joinder was improper.210 The parties have agreed to stay discovery until this
motion has been adjudicated.211
There is no way to accurately predict the outcomes of these cases or the
ramifications these decisions may have on disparate impact litigation under
the FHA for formerly incarcerated plaintiffs. However, several cases,
including Alexander v. Edgewood, call into question the constitutionality of
HUD’s 2013 regulation and 2016 guidance.212 In one case concerning the

202. See Plaintiff’s Sur-Reply in Opposition to Defendants’ Supplemental Brief in Support
of Dismissal of the Action for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction at 7, Dkt. No. 122, Fortune
Soc’y v. Sandcastle (1:14-cv-6410).
203. See Fortune Soc’y v. Sandcastle (1:14-cv-6410) docket.
204. See 1:15-cv-01140-RCL.
205. See East Capital Senior Rental LP’s Motion to Dismiss, Dkt. No. 17-1 at 10,
Alexander v. Edgewood Management Co. (D.D.C.) (1:15-cv-01140-RCL).
206. See Order, Dkt. No. 36, Alexander v. Edgewood.
207. Memorandum Opinion, Dkt. No. 35 at 5-6, Alexander v. Edgewood, (quoting Betsey
v. Turtle Creek Assoc., 736 F.2d 983, 987 (4th Cir. 1984)) (emphasis added).
208. See id. at 8.
209. Answer to Amended Complaint, Dkt. No. 38 at 13, Alexander v. Edgewood; see also
Defendants A&R Management Inc. & East Capitol Senior Rental LP’s Answer to Amended
Complaint, Dkt. No. 37, Alexander v. Edgewood.
210. See Defendants A&R Management’s Motion to Sever, Dkt. No. 44, Alexander v.
Edgewood; see also Reply in Support of Defendants A&R Management’s Motion to Sever,
Dkt. No. 51, Alexander v. Edgewood.
211. See Unopposed Motion to Stay Discovery, Dkt. No. 54, Alexander v. Edgewood.
212. See supra note 210; see also Am. Ins. Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urb. Dev., 1:13cv-966 (RJL), 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 16894 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 23, 2015).
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extension of liability to the pricing of homeowner insurance under HUD’s
2013 regulation, plaintiffs argued that the disparate-impact rule extends
beyond HUD’s statutory authority under the FHA as interpreted by the Court
in Texas v. Inclusive Communities.213 With the single party control of the
Presidency and Congress, the appointment of Justice Gorsuch to the
Supreme Court (and possible other conservative appointments to come), and
the appointment of Ben Carson as HUD Secretary, one may speculate that a
constitutional challenge against these HUD regulations and guidance will
result in an unfavorable outcome for fair-housing advocates.214
In addition to the limited historical success of disparate impact claims, the
more stringent pleading requirements under Texas v. Inclusive Communities
and the potential for HUD’s 2013 regulation and 2016 guidance to be
successfully challenged only increase the barriers and burdens surrounding
litigation. This litigation model places an additional undue burden on
disadvantaged individuals to bring claims in court.215 A victim of such
discrimination typically does not have enough resources to hire an expert
who can develop the statistical analysis that is often necessary to establish a
prima facie case of disparate impact.216 As a result, many claims cannot
survive the summary judgment stage and are dismissed.217 Moreover, any
success is case specific to the individual plaintiff and housing provider.218
Taking into account these barriers, burdens, and limitations, the current
disparate impact litigation regime does not adequately combat the incredible

213. See Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Dkt. No. 57, at ¶¶ 6,
8, Am. Ins. v. HUD, 1:13-cv-00966 (RJL) (“The Disparate-Impact Rule also runs afoul of
other limits announced in Inclusive Communities. For example, the Rule contemplates that a
plaintiff may state a prima facie claim based on a statistical disparity alone, without showing
that a policy or practice of the defendant actually caused the alleged disparity. See, e.g., 78
Fed. Reg. 11,460, 11,469. The Rule also purports to allow a disparate-impact plaintiff to
prevail by showing simply that the defendant’s stated interest in the policy or practice at issue
could be served by another practice that has a less discriminatory effect, even if the policy or
practice is valid and does not present an artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barrier. See id.
at 11,482 (24 C.F.R. § 100.500(c)(3)).”).
214. See infra notes 409-11. If a case were to successfully challenge the current HUD
regulations on a constitutional basis, given Carson’s stated opinions about government
agencies’ “social engineering” practices, under his leadership it is unlikely that HUD would
challenge such a ruling.
215. See Seicshnaydre, supra note 180, at 392.
216. See id.; see, e.g., Susan D. Carle, A Social Movement History of Title VII Disparate
Impact Analysis, 63 FLA. L. REV. 251, 257 (2011) (“It is today very rare for plaintiffs other
than highly sophisticated and well-funded litigants, such as the U.S. Department of Justice, to
prevail under Title VII on a disparate impact theory.”).
217. See id.
218. See HUD 2016 GUIDANCE, supra note 2, at 7.
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volume of housing discrimination that occurs every single year.219 The next
two sections will propose potential remedies to this ineffective model.
B.

The Equal Protection Fix: Making Formerly Incarcerated People
a Protected Class

Section II.B.1 examines arguments for granting protected class status to
formerly incarcerated individuals. Section II.B.2 concludes such protected
class status designation will still ultimately face similar problems as the
disparate impact framework, for it is still rooted in the litigation regime.
Moreover, the feasibility of this solution is questionable.
1.

The Case for Making Formerly Incarcerated People a Protected Class

Formerly incarcerated people exhibit many of the characteristics
deserving of a federally protected class as established by the Court in United
States v. Carolene Products Co.:220 “immutability, political powerlessness,
and a history of class-based discrimination.”221 Even after serving their
sentences, formerly incarcerated people continue to face collateral
consequences that restrict their rights and freedoms beyond those restrictions
ordinary citizens face.222 A growing number of scholars support the idea that
these collateral consequences “generated by structural inequality, social
stigma, criminal and civil penalties, and improved information technology,
combine to create ex-offenders’ second-class citizenship.”223 One scholar,
Ben Geiger, advocates that formerly incarcerated people should be a
protected class because (1) “ex offender class” is created by government
policies that do not allow alteration, and thus “ex-offender” status is
immutable;224 (2) “ex offenders” are discrete225 and insular226 minorities that

219. See id. (quoting U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urb. Dev., The State of Fair Housing: FY
2008 Annual Report on Fair Housing 2 (2009), http://www.hud.gov/content/releases/
fy2008annual-rpt.pdf [http://perma.cc/4GG4-XVBX] (“Each year, tens of thousands of FHA
complaints are filed, and these complaints represent ‘only a fraction of instances of housing
discrimination’ that actually occur annually, which is estimated to be about 4,000,000.”)).
220. 304 U.S. 144, n.4 (1938).
221. Geiger, supra note 78, at 1207 (referring to U.S. v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S.
144, n.4 (1938)).
222. See Lyles-Chockley, supra note 67, at 267.
223. Geiger, supra note 78, at 1194.
224. See id. at 1219 (“Overall, only a fraction of states allow for some form of clearing of
post-conviction records, and even those few states impose significant administrative and
evidentiary hurdles to legally available remedies. Thus, having a criminal record qualifies as
an unalterable classification for purposes of the suspectness inquiry.”).
225. See id. at 1226 (explaining formerly incarcerated people are distinct and easily
identifiable with the advent of new and inexpensive technology).
226. See id. 1228 (explaining that when incarcerated they are incredibly insulated, and an
argument that claims they are diffuse once released “should not remove them as candidates
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lack access to political power;227 and (3) there is a history of discrimination
against “ex offenders.”228
However, the classification of formerly incarcerated people as a protected
class can be challenged on at least two bases. First, as to the political process,
the Fourteenth Amendment permits the disenfranchisement of formerly
incarcerated people.229 The Fourteenth Amendment provides, in relevant
part, “[b]ut when the right to vote at any election . . . is denied . . . or in any
way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis
of representation shall be reduced.”230 However, some scholars argue that
the plain text reading and legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment
suggest the framers did not intend that those who could be denied voting
rights could also be denied civil rights.231 As such, a reading of the
Fourteenth Amendment that grants states the power to deprive other rights
to formerly incarcerated people, such as certain collateral consequences, is
overly broad.232
Second, critics assert that unlike immutable characteristics such as race,
formerly incarcerated people are morally culpable and responsible for their
status.233 Analyzed in a vacuum, this statement may be true. However,
scholars argue that “like Jim Crow (and slavery), mass incarceration operates
as a tightly networked system of laws, policies, customs, and institutions that
operate collectively to ensure the subordinate status of a group defined
largely by race.”234 This is at least in part attributable to a “racialized justice

for heightened scrutiny” because the fears of the populous and legislators around their
diffusion fuel legislative actions against them as a class).
227. See id. at 1191 (“Ex-offenders are not just marginalized, they are also a clear example
of repeat losers in pluralist politics. Ex-offenders are often legally disenfranchised.”).
228. Id. at 1225 (although America never formerly adopted the “civil death” of English
common law, formerly incarcerated people have always faced discrimination in this country).
229. See id.; see also Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 24 (1974) (holding that denying
the right to vote to convicted felons who had completed their sentences and paroles did not
deny equal protection).
230. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (emphasis added).
231. Geiger, supra note 78, at 1237 (“To the contrary, the framers specifically designed
the Fourteenth Amendment to guarantee Freedmen civil equality without extending political
equality.”).
232. See id.
233. See id. at 1192.
234. Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow: How the War on Drugs Gave Birth to a
Permanent American Undercaste, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 8, 2010), http://www.huffington
post.com/michelle-alexander/the-new-jim-crow-how-the_b_490386.html
[https://perma.cc/QFK6-R92W]; see also Lyles-Chockley, supra note 67, at 269 (“Upon
reentry into their communities, black ex-offenders are faced with a double stigma of having
been incarcerated and of being black . . . . In general, offenders are assumed to be dangerous,
aggressive, and unworthy of trust, and upon release are met with suspicion and hostility.
Black offenders are additionally often assumed to be unintelligent, lazy, and dishonest. The
misinterpretation of crime statistics exacerbates the stigma borne by black ex-offenders.”).
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system that disadvantages and targets people of color.”235 Thus, when one
takes into account the history of mass incarceration,236 the limits imposed by
poverty,237 the unfair targeting of people of color by law enforcement,238 the
lack of access to justice in the courts,239 and the type and degree of the crimes
and mere arrests that may put an individual in this category,240 creating a
protected class may help mitigate the dual barriers of discrimination
offenders of color face.241
As it stands today, formerly incarcerated people are not considered a
suspect class and thus, do not garner heightened judicial attention when they
challenge discriminatory policies.242 While unlikely,243 if formerly
incarcerated people were granted protected class status, Geiger argues, they
would meet the criteria for heightened scrutiny244 under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.245 Heightened scrutiny may be called
for when “prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special
condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political
processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities.”246
2.

Creating a Protected Class Will Not Adequately Address the Access to
Housing and Housing Discrimination Problems Faced By Formerly
Incarcerated People

Creating a federally protected class is unlikely to provide greater
antidiscrimination protection beyond what already exists under the disparate
treatment and disparate impact theories. First, the Court has not recognized
housing as a fundamental right. As it currently stands, a claim cannot be
brought using the Equal Protection framework of the Due Process Clause.
In terms of the future, it remains unlikely that courts will ever view housing

235. Newman, supra note 37, at 135 n.81.
236. See supra Part I.
237. See supra Section I.A.
238. See Newman, supra note 37, at 134-35.
239. See Seicshnaydre, supra note 180, at 392.
240. See supra Section I.D.
241. See Jenny Bourne, Black People Face Double Discrimination, INST. OF RACE REL.
(Oct. 27, 2003), http://www.irr.org.uk/news/black-people-face-double-discrimination/
[https://perma.cc/434C-ZSSZ].
242. See Geiger, supra note 78, at 1191.
243. It is probably not a politically viable option for legislators to advocate for protected
class status for formerly incarcerated people.
244. Heightened (or intermediate) scrutiny is used to review laws that classify on the basis
of gender and other suspect-classes. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). This
standard of review requires that the government show the classification is substantially related
to an important governmental justification. See id.
245. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; see also Geiger, supra note 78, at 1217.
246. U.S. v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, n.4 (1938).
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as a liberty interest rising to the level of a fundamental right.247 It is equally
unlikely that the federal courts would consider housing to be a “traditionally
understood right.”248 At the state level, New York is the only jurisdiction
that provides a fundamental right to shelter.249 Internationally, the United
Nations considers the right to shelter a universal human right.250
Nevertheless, the right to housing is still not protected under the United
States Constitution.
However, states can create protected classes beyond those enumerated by
the federal government. New York currently has more protected classes than
what is required at the federal level, including protections based on age,
marital status, military status, sexual orientation, and source of income, in
some jurisdictions like New York City, Buffalo, and West Seneca, as well as
Nassau, Westchester, and Suffolk counties.251 If New York were to create a
protected class for formerly incarcerated persons under the state’s Human
Rights Law, many housing policies that facially discriminate on the basis of
criminal history likely could be challenged under the disparate treatment
framework.252

247. See Geiger, supra note 78, at 1217. Collateral consequences, like housing barriers,
are infringements which are “social or economic in nature, [thus] they violate no fundamental
right for equal-protection purposes.” Id. Employment, a liberty interest that is protected by
the due process clause, is not considered a fundamental right. Seeing as the courts have used
an analogous framework for housing by adopting the Title VII disparate impact theory, it is
unlikely they would give more protections under the due process clause to housing than to
employment.
248. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (explaining that traditional rights are
those that are deeply rooted in the country’s history).
249. See N.Y. CONST. art. XVII, § 1 (“[T]he aid, care and support of the needy are public
concerns and shall be provided by the state and by such of its subdivisions.”). In Callahan v.
Carey, a New York State Supreme Court Justice declared the City was required to provide
shelter for homeless men. Clearly this right to shelter extends to the homeless, but it is not
clear this right would extend to formerly incarcerated people (unless they too were homeless).
See Callahan v. Carey, No. 79-42582 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1979).
250. See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948); International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3; S. Exec. Doc. D, 95-2 (1978), at art. 11; Convention
on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3, at art. 27; International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Mar. 7, 1966, 660
U.N.T.S. 195, at art. 5; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13, at art. 14; American Declaration of the Rights and
Duties of Man, OEA/Ser.L./V.II.23, doc. 21, rev. 6 (1948), at art. XI.
251. See N.Y.S. Human Rights Law § 292; Fair Housing FAQ’s, DHCR,
http://www.nyshcr.org/AboutUs/Offices/FairHousing/FEHOfaqs.htm#whoisprotected
[https://perma.cc/FV83-RCLY].
252. A case of disparate treatment under the FHA “refers to housing practices that
intentionally treat similarly situated persons differently. In other words, a practice qualifies
as disparate treatment if it applies rules to a protected set of people that are different from the
rules that it applies to others.” Murray IV, supra note 177, at n.40.
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There are both benefits and drawbacks to this approach. The benefit is
that victims of discrimination based on their criminal histories could make
two claims as opposed to one claim, which may increase their chances of
success. However, the creation of a protected class could lead to perverse
effects whereby housing providers participate in unwritten practices—in an
attempt to avoid disparate treatment liability—that exclude people of color
because they are statistically more likely to be criminals.253 Historically, it
has been incredibly difficult to prove explicit discriminatory intent in such
instances.254 These plaintiffs would then be in the same or a worse position
as before, and would have to bring a disparate impact claim to challenge this
practice. Additionally, the disparate treatment framework, like the disparate
impact framework, is still rooted in the litigation regime. As such, similar
issues discussed earlier would still apply.255
C.

The Local Fix: The Case for Pay for Success Implementation in
States and Municipalities

The Pay-For-Success (“PFS”) model, in conjunction with the use of social
impact bonds (“SIBs”),256 can be used as a tool to provide much needed

253. See Amanda Agan & Sonja Starr, Ban the Box, Criminal Records, and Statistical
Discrimination: A Field Experiment, U. MICH. L. & ECON. RES. PAPER NO. 16-012 (2016)
(finding that “ban the box” legislation enacted to prevent employers from reviewing criminal
histories at the initial stages of the interview process has resulted in more discrimination
against people of color. Employers have begun to refuse to hire people of color because it is
statistically more likely they have a criminal record. Instead of eliminating barriers, this
legislation might be responsible, in some cases, for making discrimination against people of
color and formerly incarcerated people worse).
254. See John F. Stanton, The Fair Housing Act and Insurance: An Update and the
Question of Disability Discrimination, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 141, 171 n.165 (2002) (citing
United States v. Real Est. Dev. Corp., 347 F. Supp. 776, 783 (N.D. Miss. 1972) (“The Court
recognizes that ‘most persons will not admit publicly that they entertain any bias or prejudice
against members of the Negro Race.’”)); Fowler v. Borough of Westville, 97 F. Supp. 2d 602,
612 (D.N.J. 2000) (“[I]t is unusual that a [FHA defendant] will openly reveal that he or she
acted on the basis of discriminatory intent.”) (quoting Horizon Hous. Dev. Serv., Inc. v. Twp.
of Upper Southhampton, 804 F. Supp. 683, 696 (E.D. Pa. 1992)).
255. See supra Section II.A.
256. See Frequently Asked Questions: Pay for Success/Social Impact Bonds, NONPROFIT
FIN. FUND 1, [hereinafter PFS FAQ] http://www.payforsuccess.org/learn-out-loud/pfs-faq/
[https://perma.cc/NJ3Y-BXGZ]. The difference between PFS and SIBs is that PFS “refer[s]
to outcomes-oriented contracts” whereas SIBs “refer to specific financing arrangements with
upfront funding provided by private investors.” Id. Other forms of financing arrangements
can also be used, such as outcomes-oriented performance loans and performance based
contracts. See id.; see also Benjamin R. Cox, Financing Homelessness Prevention Programs
with Social Impact Bonds, 31 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 959, 964 (2012) (“In typical
government-funded social programs, risk of economic loss from unsuccessful programs lies
with government; in a pure PFS arrangement, that risk is shifted to the service-providing
nonprofit organization (‘NPO’). The benefit of the SIB in conjunction with a PFS contract is
that risk of loss is transferred to the private sector and away from financially fragile NPOs.”);
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housing options for formerly incarcerated people. PFS projects are “multistakeholder partnerships that typically involve the public, private and
nonprofit sectors.”257 In PFS projects, a back-end payor (often the
government, a foundation, insurance provider, or hospital) contracts with
one or multiple service providers and agrees to pay for outcomes (as opposed
to amount of work done).258 SIBs help provide initial funding for PFS
programs. Private investors, both commercial and philanthropic, provide the
program with the upfront capital needed to fund the service, and the backend payor only repays these investors when the contractually agreed upon
outcomes come to fruition.259 Thus, tax payers’ dollars are only spent to pay
back investors on programs that generate positive outcomes.260 This way of
funding social services is “ultimately aimed at reducing the costs associated
with meeting critical needs by addressing problems early and effectively.”261
Private investment in these programs is a form of “impact investing”262—
providing investors with both a financial and social return.263 Importantly,
private investors have a growing interest in impact investing.264 According
to one study, “6 in 10 wealthy individuals feel that they can have some
influence on society by how they invest, and 45 percent agree that how they
invest is a way to express their social, political and environmental values.”265
Also, forty-six percent would be willing to accept a lower return from their
investment if the impact is great and positive, and forty-four percent would

Max Liang et al., An Overview of Social Impact Bonds, 13 J. INT’L BUS. & L. 267 (2014)
(discussing whether it is accurate to call SIBs bonds).
257. Pay for Success 101, NONPROFIT FIN. FUND [hereinafter PFS 101],
http://www.payforsuccess.org/learn/basics/ [https://perma.cc/D6JD-CR68]; see also Invest in
What Works: Pay for Success, RESULTS FOR AM., (Aug. 18, 2015), http://results4
america.org/policy-hub/invest-works-fact-sheet-social-impact-bonds/
[https://perma.cc/GL6Z-Q8LW].
258. See PFS 101, supra note 257.
259. See PFS FAQ, supra note 256, at 1.
260. See id.
261. Id. at 3.
262. Jennifer Miller Oertel et al., Proving That They Are Doing Good: What Attorneys and
Other Advisers Need to Know About Program Assessment, 59 WAYNE L. REV. 693, 701 (2013)
(“‘[I]mpact investing”—has evolved over centuries, when public and private sector groups
began investing in emerging market enterprises to fight poverty.”).
263. See PFS FAQ, supra note 256, at 5.
264. See id.
265. Tracy Palandjian & Jane Hughes, The Social Impact Bond Market: Three Scenarios
for the Future, STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV. (Dec. 19, 2013), https://ssir.org/articles/
entry/the_social_impact_bond_market_three_scenarios_for_the_future
[https://perma.cc/73XP-EG87].
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even be willing to take on a higher risk.266 Large financial institutions such
as Goldman Sachs support and promote this kind of impact investing.267
The PFS model is unique. The first project was launched in the United
Kingdom in 2010.268 The United States soon followed with the first project
launched in New York in 2012.269 Over thirty states in the U.S. have begun
to explore the PFS model and several have launched projects addressing a
wide range of issues, from homelessness to recidivism to early childhood
education.270
1.

The Structure of Pay for Success

A PFS project typically involves the following actors: (1) a government
contracting authority; (2) social service provider(s); (3) private investors; (4)
an intermediary; and (5) an independent evaluator.271 The government
engages in a pay for success contract whereby it agrees to pay back investors,
plus some agreed upon return, if it receives independent evidence that the
agreed upon targets and goals have been met by a certain date.272 The social
service provider agrees to this contract and works to achieve the target goals
within the specified time frame.273 The private investor finances the program
(usually through SIBs) and agrees to only be repaid if targets are achieved.274
The intermediary borrows the money from the private investors, distributes
the money (through SIB loans) to the social service providers, and monitors
and provides general oversight regarding the flow of funds to providers,
investors, and the contracting government authority.275 The independent
266. See id.
267. Macroeconomic Insights Social Impact Bonds, GOLDMAN SACHS (Oct. 2014),
http://www.goldmansachs.com/our-thinking/pages/social-impact-bonds.html
[https://perma.cc/2Q3R-548R].
268. See Rebeca Leventhal, Effecting Progress: Using Social Impact Bonds to Finance
Social Services, 9 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 511, 516 (2013); Liang et al., supra note 256, at 269
(SIBs were used to fund a recidivism project at Peterborough Prison: “as of June 2013,
preliminary results showed that the Peterborough bond has been successful in reducing the
re-conviction rate by 23% relative to the comparison group.”).
269. See PFS 101, supra note 257; Leventhal, supra note 268, at 515.
270. See PFS FAQ, supra note 256, at 2 (“In 2015, new projects are expected to launch in
California, Ohio, South Carolina, Illinois, Michigan, Colorado, New York, Massachusetts,
and Connecticut. The UK has 16 projects underway and projects have launched or are
developing in Canada, Australia, Mexico, Brazil, and India, among other countries.”); see
also Pay for Success U.S. Activity, NONPROFIT FIN. FUND, http://www.payforsuccess.org/paysuccess-deals-united-states [https://perma.cc/Q29S-QLRL].
271. See Deborah Burand, Globalizing Social Finance: How Social Impact Bonds and
Social Impact Performance Guarantees can Scale Development, 9 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 447,
452-53 (2013).
272. See id. at 452.
273. See id. at 453.
274. See id.
275. See id.
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evaluator assesses and determines whether the targets have been met by the
prescribed time in accordance with the contract.276 If these targets have been
met, the investors are repaid, and if they are not met, the investors are not
repaid.277
2.

The Benefits of Pay for Success

Scholars have identified eight benefits of the PFS model. First, the PFS
model enhances each program’s potential to deliver the best possible services
to the communities it serves by focusing stakeholders on the same primary
social objective and outcome, whether that be reducing recidivism,
increasing educational opportunities, providing jobs, or another goal.278 This
approach is a departure from the traditional funding model (such as grants)
that focuses on outputs or services delivered, as opposed to outcomes or
results.279 PFS models may help facilitate “a larger movement to create a
more performance-based social sector.”280
Second, this model “facilitate[s] spending on upfront prevention, reducing
the need for downstream remediation expenditures.”281 Government
spending is typically constrained by the limitations of the budgeting process.
Most spending is typically done on “crisis-driven services” to generate
results that can come to fruition within the fiscal year.282 However, by
allowing the government to transfer the risk of a prevention program to
private investors and away from taxpayers, the government can “support
prevention without the fear that they will pay the cost and not reap the
reward.”283 Thus, the government and taxpayers pay for results only, and

276. See id.
277. See PFS FAQ, supra note 256, at 5 (“If a PFS project does not achieve its intended
outcomes, government doesn’t spend any money. If a project is successful, however,
investors are repaid principal and modest rates of return relative to the risk of financing social
outcomes. The return a government pays is, in essence, a premium for not bearing the upfront
full cost- and risk- of achieving positive social outcomes. The alternative to paying this
interest ‘premium’ is risking all of government’s funding upfront on projects that may or may
not work.”).
278. See PFS FAQ, supra note 256, at 3; see also Liang et al., supra note 256, at 272 (“This
financial incentive gives investors a reason to take more of an interest in how effectively a
program is run and which interventions are used. They will require that quality controls be
implemented and that service providers are chosen based on their program model,
supervision, and management team rather than their political ties.”).
279. Leventhal, supra note 268, at 528.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 523; see also Cox, supra note 256, at 968 (“The SIB structure redirects money
from safety-net programs to more effective early-intervention programs.”).
282. Leventhal, supra note 268, at 523.
283. Id. at 525; see also id. at 524 n.33.
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serious problems that require more long-term solutions can actually be
addressed.284
Third, the PFS model allows for, and even encourages, innovation.285 PFS
programs can operate as “pilot programs” and allow the government to
partner with riskier projects that can yield a higher reward, all at the
investors’ expense, not at the tax-payers’.286 If a program is successful, the
government has the option to adopt that program and expand it to benefit a
larger population.287 This innovation can facilitate collaboration across
organizations. If service providers were funded together, as opposed to
independently on similar goals, such collaboration could yield positive
outcomes for multifaceted problems.288
Fourth, the PFS model can create more accountability289 and transparency
and lead to superior programs in general.290 Data collection is integral since
the programs are based upon outcomes and results. Governments will be
encouraged to “improve their data collection processes by integrating data
systems” which will lead to an increased understanding of “how underserved
populations interact with government systems.”291 Put another way, the data
collected by these social service providers and used to assess the success of
the program, can also be used by the government to understand more

284. See PFS FAQ, supra note 256, at 1.
285. See Liang et al., supra note 256, at 273; see also John K. Roman, et al., Five Steps to
Pay for Success: Implementing Pay for Success Projects in the Juvenile and Criminal Justice
Systems, URB. INST. 14 (June 2014) (“The focus on developing and using evidence- based
social programs may also spur innovation in the social sector as programs compete and are
adopted based on the strength of their evidence and track records of success.”).
286. See Hanna Azemati et al., Social Impact Bonds: Lessons Learned so Far, 9 CMTY.
INV. REV. ISSUE 27 (2013) (“[T]he interventions being tested in most of the initial SIB projects
are riskier, more innovative, and offer more potential learning benefits than we had
anticipated.”). On the other hand, PFS can be used to scale up proven programs. See Liang
et al., supra note 256, at 273.
287. See Kristina Costa & Sonal Shah, Government’s Role in Pay for Success, 9 CMTY.
INV. REV. ISSUE 91 (2013) (“For government agencies at all levels, PFS mechanisms create
opportunities for the public sector to reward “what works” or expand access to evidence based
preventive social interventions without requiring taxpayers to shoulder all of the financial risk
upfront.”).
288. See Leventhal, supra note 268, at 528 (“If instead both the mental health provider and
the shelter provider were funded together to achieve an outcome, they would have to
acknowledge the multi-faceted nature of the problem and work closely together to address the
underlying challenges.”); see also Cox, supra note 256, at 969 (“Outcome contracting through
an intermediary allows “organizations . . . to join forces with other organizations to provide a
tailored service that answer[s] the needs of their clients most effectively.”).
289. See Oertel et al., supra note 262, at 696 (“With everyone from individuals to
governments and foundations calling for increased accountability, it is not surprising that
donors are looking for objective means to assure that the funds they have given have achieved
the intended outcomes.”).
290. See Leventhal, supra note 268, at 526.
291. Id.
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thoroughly the extent and intensity of social problems. Through greater data
collection and analysis, governments will be able to create services that are
more attuned to community and societal needs.292
Fifth, PFS has the ability to unlock “new service delivery potentials.”293
Because outcomes are contracted for, programs can be adapted “on the fly”
to achieve the targets.294 Social service providers—and other parties295—
will be driven to discover more cost-effective ways of achieving the targeted
outcomes.296 This does not just benefit the stakeholders in the PFS program,
but also benefits philanthropists. Because of the model’s focus on outcomes,
it will reduce expenses generated by ineffective programming, thus allowing
philanthropists to be more judicious and fund innovation.297
Sixth, the PFS model enables a stable, multiyear revenue stream to service
providers.298 The financial burden to provide the upfront funds is not born
by the government or non-profit service providers.299 Typically, many nonprofits struggle with funding and resources, and as a result must devote
substantial amounts of time and energy to finding financing as opposed to
devoting their time to the social services they offer.300 By having upfront
costs taken care of, non-profit service providers have the opportunity to

292. See Justin Milner & Matthew Eldridge, From Evidence to Outcomes: Using Evidence
to Inform Pay for Success Project Design, URB. INST. 8 (May 2016), http://pfs.urban.org/
library/content/evidence-outcomes-using-evidence-inform-pay-success-project-design
[https://perma.cc/Z85A-KRCG] (“Using evidence to make public welfare decisions improves
government effectiveness and drives better outcomes for society. Pay for success can be on
the front line of that change, helping improve the use and availability of evidence by making
stakeholders consumers and generators of evidence.”).
293. Cox, supra note 256, at 969.
294. Id.; PFS FAQ, supra note 256, at 3 (explaining service providers can “course correct”
as needed to achieve the target goals).
295. See Liang et al., supra note 256, at 272 (“[I]nherent within the model is a strong
incentive for all parties to pursue performance and cost efficiency in achieving the program
goals.”).
296. Emily Bolton & Louise Savell, Towards a New Social Economy: Blended Value
Creation Through Social Impact Bonds, SOC. FIN. 3 (Mar. 2010), http://www.social
finance.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/Towards-A-New-Social-Economy-web.pdf
[https://perma.cc/P9RP-9DUW].
297. See Leventhal, supra note 268, at 525.
298. See id. at 527.
299. See PFS FAQ, supra note 256, at 1 (explaining that “Private investors—commercial
and philanthropic—provide the upfront capital needed” through SIBs).
300. See Leventhal, supra note 268, at 527; see also Cox, supra note 256, at 970
(“Admittedly, SIB structures are not a panacea for every social problem, but—where viable—
they present many advantages over traditional grant and appropriation financing.”).
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“think strategically about robust scaling efforts and to focus their energy on
providing excellent services.”301
Seventh, the PFS model expands access to a market previously
unavailable to non-profits.302 Traditionally service providers rely on
foundation assets provided by philanthropists.303 That pool of money is
roughly seven hundred billion dollars.304 The PFS model creates an asset
that investors can invest in.305 The amount of money then available to
finance these programs is dramatically increased: “there are some $200
trillion of financial assets; creating a pipeline from social outcomes to these
$200 trillion forms a pathway to a new world where social entrepreneurs can
get the capital they need to scale critical services and where people in need
have access to services they require.”306
Eighth, this model also benefits investors in two ways: (1) investors can
gain a financial return while achieving a social impact—investors make
money by utilizing their portfolio for a greater social benefit; and (2)
investors now have access to new assets that are not connected to other
investments, thereby spreading their risk. Since returns are linked to social
outcomes, not traditional investment benchmarks, investors can diversify
their risk in their portfolios by social impact investing, “rather than
compound any one set of risks.”307
3.

The Risks of Pay for Success

The PFS model it is not without risks. Risks stem from the fact that PFS
utilizes SIBs that are “a complicated, multi-party and cross-sector financial
instrument, which is still in its infancy stage today.”308 Scholar Deborah
Burand has grouped the risks of the PFS model into the following categories:

301. Leventhal, supra note 268, at 528; see also Cox, supra note 256, at 970 (“Multi-year
contracts allow service providers to do more service providing and less time consuming
fundraising.”).
302. See Leventhal, supra note 268, at 529 (“By monetizing social outcomes, Social Impact
Bonds create an asset that investors can invest in, expanding the pot of money available
beyond philanthropy and government grants to true investment capital.”).
303. See id. at 528; see also Toussaint, supra note 67, at 78 (explaining that, alternative
funding is “especially important during an era of government austerity at both the state and
local levels”).
304. See Leventhal, supra note 268, at 529.
305. See id.
306. See id.; see also Sir Ronald Cohen & William A. Sahlman, Social Impact Investing
Will Be the New Venture Capital, HBR BLOG NETWORK (Jan. 17, 2013), http://blogs.hbr.org/
cs/2013/01/social_impact_investing_will_b.html [https://perma.cc/6FEH-MF5Q].
307. See Leventhal, supra note 268, at 527, 527 n.44.
308. See Liang et al., supra note 256, at 273.
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(1) intervention model risk; (2) execution risk; (3) intermediary risk; (4)
political risk; (5) financial risk; and (6) reputational risk.309
Intervention model risk is the possibility that the outcomes expected are
not produced.310 One way to mitigate this risk is to rely on proven models.311
However, this may make funding harder to obtain for smaller fledgling nonprofits with new and untested ideas.312 One way to reduce intervention
model risk is to ensure that appropriate metrics are: (1) used to provide
feedback on the progress of the program; and (2) are correlated strongly with
the expected financial benefit of the program.313
Execution risk is created by performance challenges that are specific to
the structure of a given model.314 First, social providers that have been
selected for programs may “prove to be weak or otherwise unable to scale
the intervention as expected.”315 Second, a badly executed program can
“wreak havoc on the very populations that the SIB is meant to serve.”316
Third, there is a risk that social service providers may take “inappropriate
actions” such as withholding information that shows a program may not
reach its targets or, at worst, falsifying information to meet the targets.317
However, there are several ways the government can mitigate these risks.318
For example, the government can require due diligence to mitigate this

309.
310.
311.
312.

See Burand, supra note 271, at 467.
See id. at 468.
See id.
See Rick Cohen, Eight Sobering Thoughts for Social Impact Bond Supporters,
NONPROFIT Q. (June 12, 2014), https://nonprofitquarterly.org/2014/06/12/eight-soberingthoughts-for-social-impact-bond-supporters/ [https://perma.cc/LH6T-EXPP].
313. Liang et al., supra note 256, at 274.
314. See Burand, supra note 271, at 469.
315. Id.
316. Id. at 469 (explaining that if players give up on the programs when and if they do not
reach their targets prematurely, this runs a “shut down” risk whereby those social services
once provided on a smaller scale are no longer operational).
317. Id. at 470 (“For example, a social service provider participating in a SIB aimed at
reducing the number of children residing in foster care might start returning children to
dangerous family situations without sufficient regard for the children’s safety. Or a social
service provider participating in a SIB aimed at prisoner recidivism might interfere with legal
processes to ensure that reconviction rates are delayed or inappropriately frustrated during
periods when SIB reconviction targets are to be measured.”); see also PFS FAQ, supra note
256, at 7 (discussing skimming dangers: programs may be biased in their selection of program
participants—those who are more statistically likely to achieve the positive outcomes needed
to achieve targets so investors are repaid. This can disadvantage groups who are in the most
need of these kind of social programs in the first place.).
318. See Burand, supra note 271, at 472 (Investors can also help to mitigate these risks “1)
before an investment, through their decisions about whether to invest in a particular SIB
(including due diligence as to the SIB intermediary, the likely social service providers, and
their potential fellow SIB investors) and 2) once invested, through the influence they exert on
the governance of the SIB intermediary.”).
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risk.319 The government can also include certain contractual provisions that
allow it to terminate or replace social service providers who act
inappropriately.320 The government can also support independent watchdog
organizations, distinct from the independent evaluator, that ensure the
protection of vulnerable populations by providing independent oversight of
PFS programs.321
Intermediary risk is the risk that the intermediary will not perform its
obligations and thus thwart the financial and social goals of the program.322
Since this is such a new model, intermediaries that lack experience may fail
to manage the project well.323 Additionally, if their role as intermediary is
not their primary job, they also may not have the time necessary to
adequately manage a project.324 One way to mitigate this risk would be to
develop best practices for intermediaries.325
Political risk refers to “both the capacity and the will of the host
government to undertake its obligations.”326 Government entrenchment can
result in an unwillingness to participate in PFS programs.327 Also, since
government officials change, new administrations may not adhere to former
obligations.328 Further, if a government has limited experience, this political
risk is exacerbated.329 For example, some programs may be priced too
highly, and an inexperienced government may not recognize this.330 Thus,
government commitment331 and executive leadership within government are
often critically important to a program’s success.332 Additionally, some

319. Presumably this due diligence would be undertaken by the government before the
contract is entered into in order to assess the staff training, codes of conduct, financial
incentive schemes, and reputation of social service provider. See id. at 471.
320. See id.
321. See id. at 471-72.
322. See id. at 472.
323. See id.
324. See id.
325. See id. at 473 (“Drawing on such practices should also help reduce the risk of SIB
intermediary failure. Similarly, as more organizations gain experience in SIB intermediation,
there may be opportunities for weak SIB intermediaries to be eased out and new SIB
intermediaries to be recruited.”).
326. Id.
327. See id. at 475.
328. See id. For example, some states may require special legislation to allow for PFS
contracting. If one administration makes this promise and is then replaced with another
administration that does not look favorably on the PFS model, this legislation may not be
enacted.
329. See id. at 473.
330. See id. at 474.
331. See Cox, supra note 256, at 979 (“The problem of multi-year contracting is solved by
pledging the government’s full faith and credit to multi-year commitments.”).
332. See Burand, supra note 271, at 475.
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programs may require the adoption of legislation to ensure the government
is bound to a long term PFS contract.333
Financial risks are largely born by the investors.334 First, the investor’s
money is often locked up in the model for years: “investors must be willing
to tolerate high liquidity risk since the duration of a bond is anywhere from
3 to 10 years with no early termination.”335 Transaction and monitoring costs
in the early stages of PFS models may be incredibly high.336 Once these PFS
contracts become more standardized, the transaction costs will likely lower
at least moderately.337 Moreover, there are some risk-mitigation methods
that can “be applied to the social impact bond structure, such as reserve
funds, first-loss provisions, and other credit enhancing methods.”338 Also
the government can explore tax solutions to encourage investors to
participate in this type of financing.339
Reputational risks affect all players; however, service providers bear the
brunt of this risk if targets are not met.340 The reputational risk also extends
to PFS programs in general. If some programs prove to be unsuccessful due
to any of the aforementioned risks, governments may shy away from using
this model to address other societal problems.341
There are also several general concerns with the PFS model. First,
because it is still a new innovation in the United States, it is difficult to
predict whether this model will become more popular or if it will stagnate.342
Second, there is a risk that if PFS programs become more mainstream, they
333. See Cox, supra note 256, at 979 (“Typical appropriations statutes are often unable to
commit the government to either multi-year or contingent contracts, while a PFS/SIB contract
requires both . . . . Congress should . . . pass an appropriations statute that authorizes longterm contracts and allows for future redirection of any unused funds, for another closely
related high priority purpose.”) (internal citations and quotations omitted); see also Burand,
supra note 271 at 476 (“Several states in the United States are contemplating or have enacted
legislation intended to advance the issuance of SIBs or SIB-like financial instruments. One
of the first states to enact such legislation was Massachusetts.”).
334. See Burand, supra note 271, at 478.
335. Liang et al., supra note 256, at 274.
336. See Toussaint, supra note 67, at 79 (“SIBs are very complex transactions with high
transaction costs, requiring significant legal and financial expertise, institutional expertise,
and detailed negotiation among key stakeholders.”).
337. See Burand, supra note 271, at 479; see also, Toussaint, supra note 67, at 80
(explaining that negotiating these contracts require high levels of sophistication and thus may
inhibit smaller non-profits from participating).
338. Liang et al., supra note 256, at 274. See generally Burand, supra note 271 (providing
an in depth examination of these methods).
339. See Cox, supra note 256, at 981-82 (“Because the government already realizes
significant savings upon successful completion of a SIB-funded program, legislators should
consider exempting investor SIB earnings from capital gains taxation.”).
340. See Burand, supra note 271, at 480.
341. See id.
342. See Palandjian & Hughes, supra note 265.
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will cannibalize funding from non-profits who do not participate.343 Third,
not all social goods are easily quantifiable. This model may be limited to
only those programs that can be easily measured and monetized, creating the
unintended effect of ignoring some of the more challenging social ills.344
Additionally, there is a risk that the programs funded will rely on
oversimplified models that “obscure the true scope of the costs, benefits, and
savings to local communities.”345 Fourth, monetizing social progress may
lead to favoring local incrementalism in lieu of broad based reform.346 Fifth,
others argue that PFS models risk privatizing the public sector, and instead
we should “consider a simpler solution—public investments in schools, jobs,
social programs and innovate criminal justice.”347
4.

Federal and State Support for Pay for Success

The 2016 federal budget invests seventy million dollars in the Social
Innovation Fund (“SIF”), housed under the Corporation for National and
Community Service (“CNCS”), and proposes twenty percent be available for
PFS projects.348 Importantly, the Senate Appropriations Committee
submitted a draft of the 2017 budget to the Senate floor that defunds SIF.349
Conversely, the House Appropriations Committee submitted a budget that
provides fifty million dollars to SIF with a twenty percent set aside for pay
for success.350 In April 2016, CNCS announced twenty-five SIB PFS
competition sub-awards, and over the summer, announced three more
grantees.351

343. See PFS FAQ, supra note 256, at 4.
344. See V. Kasturi Rangan & Lisa A. Chase, The Payoff of Pay-for-Success, STAN. SOC.
INNOVATION REV., (2015), https://ssir.org/up_for_debate/article/the_payoff_of_pay_for_
success [https://perma.cc/S2QQ-GKCY] (“Most important, in the rush to quantify costs and
benefits, we fear that there could be a retraction from those social issues where the outcomes
are hard to pin down and successful interventions hard to identify, but which are the very
issues demanding society’s attention and resources.”).
345. Toussaint, supra note 67, at 81.
346. See id. at 81.
347. See Donald Cohen & Jennifer Zelnick, What We Learned from the Failure of Rikers
Island Social Impact Bond, NONPROFIT Q. (Aug. 7, 2015), https://nonprofitquarterly.org/
2015/08/07/what-we-learned-from-the-failure-of-the-rikers-island-social-impact-bond/
[https://perma.cc/U2MU-9PE2].
348. See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION–FISCAL YEAR 2016, CNCS 6, 45, 94-95
(appendix 1) (2016), http://www.nationalservice.gov/sites/default/files/page/cncs_2016_CBJ
_Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/X43Q-BBUL].
349. See Nicole Truhe, State of Play: Pay for Success and Evidence-Based Policy,
NEWPROFIT (July 2016), http://www.newprofit.org/state-of-play-pay-for-success-andevidence-based-policy-junejuly-2016/ [https://perma.cc/R4CN-JHGB].
350. See id.
351. See id.
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During fiscal year 2014/2015, Congress authorized the Department of
Justice (“DOJ”) to provide funds to implement Permanent Supportive
Housing for those cycling in and out of the criminal justice system and
homeless services.352 HUD and DOJ awarded a total of $8.7 million in
grants to different entities that focus on using the PFS model to address
homelessness and reduce recidivism.353
In addition to these budgetary measures, Congress appears to be in favor
of aspects of the PFS model. In March 2016, Congress passed the EvidenceBased Policymaking Commission Act, which established a commission to
develop practices that will ensure evidence and outcomes are used to decide
federal policy and budget proposals.354 The commission is tasked with
exploring how to use federal data sources in a more useful way for analysis
and research, how to connect data sets, examine infrastructure necessary to
make data more accessible to researchers, provide recommendations as to
how to evaluate program designs, and how to protect security and privacy.355
In June 2016, the House introduced and passed the Social Impact
Partnerships to Pay for Results Act.356 The Senate version has been
introduced and referred to the Committee on Finance.357 Both versions of
this Act would “direct federal resources to states and local communities to
support innovative Pay for Success feasibility studies, evaluations, and end
payment structures.”358
Over thirty states have embarked on some exploration of PFS
programs.359 Several states have set aside funding in their budgets for PFS
programs;360 a number of states enacted or introduced legislation to fund PFS

352. See id.
353. See id. (“The seven grantees are: Corporation for Supportive Housing, Third Sector
Capital Partners, United Way of Anchorage, Rhode Island Coalition for the Homeless,
University of Utah, American Institutes of Research, and Ending Community Homelessness
Coalition.”).
354. See id.; see also Public Law No: 114-140.
355. See Public Law No: 114-140.
356. See H.R. 5170; Truhe, supra note 349; CONG. RES. SERV., SUMMARY: H.R. 5170,
[hereinafter CRS SUMMARY] https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/5170
[https://perma.cc/9SXX_JDN2] (explaining that this is a reworked version of the “Social
Impact Partnership Act” (H.R. 1336/S. 1089) which was introduced in both houses earlier).
357. See Truhe, supra note 349 (“The Senate is now considering whether to take up the
new House version of the bill, which includes a one-year reauthorization of TANF and a pay
for or funding offset, or to try and move their bill in which case they still need to find a way
to fund the bill and a legislative vehicle to move the bill forward.”); CRS SUMMARY, supra
note 356.
358. Truhe, supra note 349.
359. See NONPROFIT FIN. FUND, supra note 270.
360. New York and Massachusetts. See id.
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programs and contracts generally;361 several others have initiated on PFS
studies;362 and others have introduced PFS funding for specific purposes
such as education and reducing recidivism.363
5.

New York’s Recidivism Pay for Success Program and Massachusetts’
Homelessness Pay for Success Program

The Nonprofit Finance Fund conducted a review of the first ten PFS
projects in the United States.364 Of those ten, three focused on recidivism365
and three focused on homelessness generally.366 This Section will examine
and compare two of these programs: NYC ABLE Project for Incarcerated
Youth and Massachusetts Chronic Homelessness Pay for Success Initiative.
NYC ABLE is the only project that has come to completion.367 This
program’s objective was to reduce recidivism of male adolescents
incarcerated at Rikers Island by at least ten percent using cognitive
behavioral therapy to improve personal responsibility and decision
making.368 This was a transplanted project, meaning it was modeled on
programs from other locations and service providers.369 It was designed as
a four-year project but provided the investor with a choice to continue

361. General legislation has passed or been introduced in California, Ohio, Rhode Island,
South Carolina, and Washington; contract legislation passed or introduced in Colorado,
Florida, Pennsylvania, Texas, and the District of Columbia. See id.
362. Legislation has been passed or introduced in Hawaii, Maine, Nevada, and Vermont.
See id.
363. Legislation has been passed or introduced in Colorado, Idaho, New Hampshire, and
Oklahoma. See id.
364. See NONPROFIT FIN. FUND, Pay for Success: The First Generation (April 2016),
[hereinafter The First Generation] http://www.payforsuccess.org/sites/default/files/resourcefiles/Pay%20for%20Success_The%20First%20Generation_0_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/HPB68WLY].
365. See id. at 4. NYC ABLE Project for Incarcerated Youth, launched in 2012; Increasing
Employment and Improving Public Safety, launched in 2013; and Massachusetts Juvenile
Justice PFS Initiative, launched in 2014. See id.
366. See id. Massachusetts Chronic Homelessness Pay for Success Initiative, launched in
2014; Project Welcome Home, launched in 2015; and Housing to Heath Initiative, launched
in 2016. See id.
367. See id. at 25. The initial investment was $9.6 million, the return to investors ranged
from eleven to twenty-two percent, the service providers were Friends of Island Academy and
the Osborne Association, and the back-payor was the NYC Department of Corrections. See
id. at 25.
368. Program Summary–ABLE, NYC YOUNG MEN’S INITIATIVE, CTR. FOR ECON.
OPPORTUNITY (2013), http://www.nyc.gov/html/ceo/downloads/pdf/able_fy13q3_update.pdf
[https://perma.cc/K2WG-37EK]; see id. at 4; see also Fact Sheet: The NYC ABLE Project
for Incarcerated Youth, (Aug. 2, 2012) http://www.nyc.gov/html/om/pdf/2012/sib_
fact_sheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/A8SF-8P5C] (“[This] program aims to reduce the
reincarceration rate among adolescents at Rikers Island through an evidenced-based
intervention that focuses on improving personal responsibility and decision-making.”).
369. See The First Generation, supra note 364, at 4, 7.
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funding the program for a fourth year based on the first year participants’
results after a two-year evaluation period.370 This initial evaluation did not
show an impact on the recidivism rate, so the program was terminated after
the third year.371 The other programs that have not yet been completed offer
the first initial repayment in 2017.372
One program in particular caught the attention of the press:373 the
Massachusetts Chronic Homelessness Pay for Success Initiative.374 This
program was initiated to address the 1500 chronically homeless people in the
state who lack access to stable housing and, as a result, use temporary
shelters, Medicaid, and emergency services at a high-cost to the state.375 The
project intended to improve health, end homelessness, and increase personal
stability by achieving one year of housing stability.376 The goal of the
program, designed to run for six years, is to provide at minimum five
hundred supportive housing units to up to eight hundred program
participants.377 While the program is not yet complete, in its first year it
surpassed its minimum goal and successfully housed over 250 individuals in
supportive housing.378

370. Id. at 5.
371. See id. The outcomes tied to payments were: (1) the number of people served by the
program, and (2) the total days of jail avoided. See id. at 16. Bloomberg Philanthropies acted
as the guarantor, and guaranteed $7.2 million. See id. at 25. Thus, Goldman Sachs only
incurred a net loss of $2.4 million. See id.
372. See id. at 30. One program, Project Welcome Home, offers repayment annually.
373. See, e.g., Deborah De Santis, MA Pay for Success Worth Watching, HUFFINGTON POST
(Aug. 17, 2016), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/deborah-de-santis/ma-pay-for-successworth_b_11571894.html [https://perma.cc/69D6-EA98].
374. See The First Generation, supra note 364, at 25. The initial investment was for $3.5
million (senior investment: $1 million from Santander Bank, $1 million from United Way of
Massachusetts Bay and Merrimak Valley, $0.5 million from CSH; Grant money: $0.25
million from Santander Bank and $0.75 million from United Way of Massachusetts Bay and
Merrimak Valley). See id. The investors will receive an interest rate that is calculated based
on the level of success of the program and paid annually starting at the end of the second year
of the program. See id. at 31 n.5. The service provider is the Massachusetts Housing and
Shelter Alliance. See id. at 8. The back-payor is the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and
the Project manager is the Massachusetts Alliance for Supportive Housing. See id.
375. See id. at 4. While there is an overlap in the homeless population and the formerly
incarcerated population, this program focuses on the chronically homelessness. Formerly
incarcerated people who are also homeless may benefit from these programs, but the program
does not exclusively target that population. See id.
376. See id. at 16. The outcome tied to payments is that stable housing is achieved for at
least one year.
377. See id. at 4.
378. See Pay for Success 2016 Fact Sheet, MASS. HOUS. & SHELTER ALL. (Oct. 2016),
http://www.mhsa.net/sites/default/files/PFS%20Fact%20Sheet%20October%202016.pdf
[https://perma.cc/86LG-QN8T]; Press Release: Pay for Success Initiative to Reduce Chronic
Individual Homelessness Successfully Houses over 250 Individuals in the First Year, MASS.
HOUS. & SHELTER ALL. (Aug. 3, 2016), http://www.mhsa.net/news/pay-for-success-initiative-
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The failure of the NYC program compared to the success of the
Massachusetts program is attributable to differences in the financing,
structure, and design of the two programs.
The NYC and Massachusetts programs were financed very differently.
The investment in the NYC program by Goldman Sachs was guaranteed by
the Bloomberg Philanthropies for up to $7.2 million,379 whereas the investors
in the Massachusetts program have no such guarantee.380 Also, the NYC
program only had one investor whereas the Massachusetts program has three
investors and was partly funded by grant money.381 Presumably, the cost
and efficacy of monitoring would be less for each individual investor in the
Massachusetts program than Goldman Sachs as a single investor. Moreover,
one can speculate that Goldman Sachs as a single investor with a substantial
guarantee may not have monitored the program as rigorously as compared
to the multiple investors in the Massachusetts program with no guarantee.
Additionally, the NYC and Massachusetts programs were designed very
differently. The NYC program was a transplanted design to help assist a
very high-risk population, unlike the Massachusetts program, which is a
scaling project designed to help the chronically homeless.382 First, the two
program’s target populations could be one factor that inhibited success:
while both populations are in need, juveniles in Rikers are a particularly
high-risk population.383 Second, using a transplanted design is inherently
riskier than scaling up a proven model for a target population.384 Thus, the
NYC program’s lack of success in meeting its targets may be because the
program was inherently risky.385 In addition, the Massachusetts program is
set to run for a longer period of time than the NYC program. It is possible
that the targets set in the NYC program may have been unrealistic or
unachievable within the shorter time frame. Further, the NYC program was
to-reduce-chronic-individual-homelessness-successfully-houses-over-250-individuals-infirst-year [https://perma.cc/BQL7-DVFC].
379. See The First Generation, supra note 364, at 25.
380. See id.
381. See id.
382. See id. at 12.
383. See MDRC Statement on the Vera Institute’s Study of the Adolescent Behavioral
Learning Experience (ABLE) Program at Rikers Island, MDRC (July 2015), [hereinafter
MDRC Statement] http://www.mdrc.org/news/announcement/mdrc-statement-vera-institutes-study-adolescent-behavioral-learning-experience [https://perma.cc/37W8-3B2Q] (NYC
ABLE was designed “to tackle one of New York City’s most challenging problems—
recidivism among adolescents incarcerated at Rikers Island. All of the parties understood that
it was a high risk undertaking.”).
384. See Burand, supra note 271, at 468.
385. See, e.g., MDRC Statement, supra note 383 (“As described in MDRC’s 2013 report,
the implementation of ABLE faced a number of challenges, including reaching adolescents
who did not attend the Rikers school and the indeterminate lengths of stay for many of the
young people.”).
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a cognitive behavioral therapy program, and as such, it may have been hard
to value the positive effects of this program through the chosen metrics of
measurement.
Instead of viewing the NYC program as a failure, we should learn from
386
it.
Despite the fact that the NYC program did not meet its targets, it may
have lasting positive effects at Rikers Island. The program was unique
because it “attempted to change part of the culture in Rikers Island by
introducing an intervention for a very high-needs population for whom little
to no programming was previously offered.”387 It encouraged Rikers
management and non-uniform staff to participate and work closely with the
service provider, which could result in a positive cultural change among the
staff that benefits the incarcerated population.388 Moreover, the program did
in fact have some measurable positive impacts on the sixteen to eighteen year
old population: in 2013, eighty-seven percent of those held for more than
six days attended at least one ABLE session, and “44 percent reached a
programmatic milestone found in prior studies to be associated with positive
outcomes.”389
6.

Proven Models: Non-Profits that Address Housing Issues of Formerly
Incarcerated People in New York

There are several non-profit organizations that assist formerly
incarcerated people with accessing safe, secure, affordable housing. This
Note highlights three: the Fortune Society, the Osborne Association, and
Community Access. These non-profits and their housing programs can be
candidates for future PFS projects.
The Fortune Society provides a multitude of comprehensive services to
formerly incarcerated people, including “low-threshold access to supportive
emergency, phased-permanent, and permanent housing.”390
Their
391
While residing there,
emergency shelter service offers sixty-two beds.
residents spend thirty-five hours per week doing productive activities,
undergo daily drug screening, and participate in morning and evening
support groups along with other supportive services.392 Within one year,
these residents are transitioned to supportive-permanent housing or other

386. See Cohen & Zelnick, supra note 347.
387. MDRC Statement, supra note 383.
388. See id.
389. Id.
390. Housing, FORTUNE SOC’Y (Sept. 7, 2013), http://fortunesociety.org/programs/housing
[https://perma.cc/RFX5-AA5N].
391. See Ross, supra note 114.
392. See The Fortune Academy at a Glance 2013-2015, FORTUNE SOC’Y (on file with
author) [hereinafter At A Glance].
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adequate housing placement.393 These programs have had great success
housing the formerly incarcerated in permanent housing.394
The Osborne Association also provides many services, including its
Housing Placement and Assistance (“HPA”) program.395 This program
provides independent, supportive, and transitional housing options, in
addition to Home Start-Up Kits and rental assistance.396 Additionally, it
offers housing retention activities that are available to participants for the
first year following release.397 The Osborne Association offers two
supportive services: Safety Counts and Project HIRE. Safety Counts helps
high risk drug users correct their behavior and partners with Project Street
Beat to provide on-site HIV/HVC testing.398 The program is offered in
English and Spanish.399
Community Access is a supportive housing provider that first pioneered
the integrated housing model in the mid 1970s to provide affordable housing
to low income families, veterans, youth aging out of foster care, and
individuals with psychiatric disabilities.400 They have developed over
twenty affordable housing projects in New York City.401 They offer
supportive services for mental and physical health, employment, education,
and substance use.402
These proven models could be promising candidates for scaling up using
the PFS financing structure so that they reach a larger population of formerly
incarcerated people and help them obtain safe, stable, and affordable
housing.

393. See Ross, supra note 114; At a Glance, supra note 392.
394. See At a Glance, supra note 392 (stating that seventy-nine percent of those who
participated in phase II of the program transitioned to permanent housing, and another five
percent moved to another successful placement).
395. See Wellness & Prevention, OSBORNE ASS’N (2012), http://www.osborneny.org/
programs.cfm?programID=3 [https://perma.cc/GY7N-22E6].
396. See id.
397. See id.
398. See id.
399. See id.
400. See Housing, COMTY. ACCESS, http://www.communityaccess.org/our-work/housing
[https://perma.cc/RAC6-5DBS].
401. See id.
402. See id.; Education & Job Training, COMTY. ACCESS, http://www.community
access.org/our-work/educationajobreadiness [https://perma.cc/LCZ8-QVZU]; Health &
Wellness, COMTY. ACCESS, http://www.communityaccess.org/our-work/health-a-wellness
[https://perma.cc/N79Y-W5LW].
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III. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE FUTURE: STATE AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT IMPLEMENTATION OF PAY FOR SUCCESS PROGRAMS
FOR FORMERLY INCARCERATED PEOPLE
In order to ensure that formerly incarcerated people can access safe,
affordable, and stable housing, states should first, continue to experiment
with the PFS model and second, invest in programs that address the housing
needs of the formerly incarcerated who reside in their states. While this Note
advocates for the use of PFS to address the needs of this population, it does
not ignore the legitimate fear of many in the public sector that PFS programs
will eventually privatize the public sector.403 Ideally, the government should
be making more public investments to assist the formerly incarcerated; a
population comprised of predominately people of color who are, in many
cases, initially victims of a racialized criminal justice system and
subsequently, victims of severe discrimination in housing. However, in a
time in which local government budgets are constrained, and the President
proposes reducing HUD’s budget by six billion dollars404 and slashing
funding for many other administrative agencies responsible for a variety of
social programs that states rely on,405 it is unlikely such a plea to state and
local governments to invest in public programs for formerly incarcerated
people will be successful. To truly address this issue, it is critical to explore
new and creative funding mechanisms that may be more attractive to local
governments in a time of fiscal austerity. Moreover, the current litigation
regime, standing alone, is simply deficient to combat instances of
discrimination formerly incarcerated people face. PFS is not a panacea to
replace public spending on all social ills. But in the interest of justice for the
formerly incarcerated, we should strive for substance over form.

403. See supra note 347 and accompanying text.
404. See Jose A. DelReal, Trump Budget Asks for $6 Billion in HUD Cuts, Drops
Development Grants, WASH. POST (Mar. 16, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
politics/trump-budget-asks-for-6-billion-in-hud-cuts-drops-development-grants/2017/03/15/
1b157338-09a0-11e7-b77c-0047d15a24e0_story.html [https://perma.ccSH69-FC4M].
405. See Andrew Taylor, Trump Budget Slashes Federal Agencies and the Arts to Focus
on Border Wall, Defense Spending, CHI. TRIB. (Mar. 16, 2017), http://www.chicago
tribune.com/news/nationworld/politics/ct-trump-budget-20170316-story.html
[https://perma.cc/9QM6-DPZG] (“President Donald Trump’s new $1.15 trillion budget
would reshape America’s government with the broad, conservative strokes he promised as a
candidate, ordering generous increases for the military, slashing domestic programs and riling
both fellow Republicans and Democrats by going after favored programs.”); Russell Berman,
President Trump’s ‘Hard Power’ Budget, ATLANTIC (Mar. 16, 2017), https://www.the
atlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/03/president-trumps-hard-power-budget/519702/
[https://perma.cc/V3AY-WSJ7] (“The Trump administration wants to eliminate federal
funding of 19 agencies and commissions, including the National Endowments for the Arts
and the Humanities, the Legal Services Corporation, the Institute of Peace, and an interagency
council on homelessness.”).

582

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XLIV

The current litigation regime bars access to justice for many formerly
incarcerated people who face housing discrimination. Formerly incarcerated
litigants must bring their own FHA claims under the disparate impact theory
to attempt to secure safe, stable, and affordable housing. Those who do bring
claims have had limited success in the past, and the more stringent pleading
requirements from Texas v. Inclusive Communities, make future success
even less likely.406 Litigation is slow, time consuming, expensive, and places
a heavy burden on those already disadvantaged to bring these claims.407
More significantly, disparate impact litigation cannot combat the massive
volume of discrimination that occurs every single year.408 Additionally,
given the current political landscape, it is unlikely President Trump or
Congress will support any reforms to increase the likelihood of success of
disparate impact litigation.409 For example, current HUD Secretary Ben
Carson previously accused HUD of “social engineering” when the agency
announced that state and local governments that received federal funding for
housing must build affordable units in wealthier, healthier neighborhoods
and not solely poor neighborhoods.410 Some fear Secretary Carson will send
a message to states that “it is again perfectly fine for governments around the
country to return to a policy of racial isolation.”411 It is also equally unlikely
that a protected class of formerly incarcerated people will be established, and
even if it were, similar litigation challenges would apply.412 Thus, if reform
is to occur it must be undertaken by states and reach beyond litigation.
The potential social benefits of the PFS models outweigh the potential
risks—if PFS programs for the formerly incarcerated are structured
responsibly, effectively, and with appropriate safeguards. The structure of
PFS increases the chances of achieving the best possible services for
communities by focusing all stakeholders around achieving a social good;413

406. See supra Section II.A.
407. See supra Section II.A.
408. See supra Section II.A.
409. See, e.g., Matt Apuzzo, Under Trump, Approach to Civil Rights Law is Likely to
Change Definitively, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 19, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/19/us/
politics/civil-rights-justice-department-donald-trump.html [https://perma.cc/4VNA-WDKW]
(describing Trump’s pick for Attorney General, Jeff Sessions’ views on civil rights litigation
and discrimination. During Session’s confirmation hearing, when asked about prosecuting
sex and gender discrimination cases at the federal level, Sessions is quoted saying “I am not
sure women or people with different sexual orientations face that kind of discrimination. I
just don’t see it.”).
410. See Carson, supra note 23.
411. See The Editorial Board, Ben Carson’s Warped View of Housing, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
19, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/19/opinion/ben-carsons-warped-view-of-hou
sing.html [https://perma.cc/WPL6-G3GV].
412. See supra Section II.B.
413. See supra notes 278-80 and accompanying text.
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PFS will support prevention programs and only spend tax payer dollars on
positive social outcomes;414 it will allow for more creative collaboration and
innovation;415 it will vastly expand data collection and transparency,
allowing government to continue to create more effective programs that
address actual community needs;416 it will encourage cost-effective ways to
achieve social good;417 it will provide financial stability to service
providers;418 and it will expand the market available to finance non-profits
doing good work.419 While there are risks, the government can mitigate
many by relying on proven models;420 ensuring metrics are appropriate;421
conducting due diligence;422 agreeing to termination terms in contracts to
curb bad behavior;423 supporting watch dog organizations;424 creating best
practices for intermediaries;425 and setting aside budget dollars and creating
legislation to ensure the duration of PFS contracts.426 Moreover, any
instances of early failure offer learning opportunities to enable better
designed and successful future programs, and even then, less measurable but
positive effects can still result.427
States should take this opportunity to invest in PFS programs specifically
designed to help formerly incarcerated people access stable, affordable
housing by dedicating state budget dollars to these programs, and investing
based on need. For example, states can work within the flexible PFS
framework to allocate funding using government data sets to examine how
many released persons annually lack stable homes to re-enter, and how many
would benefit from housing with supportive services for drug addiction and
mental health. They can then allocate funds accordingly, using proven
models to further mitigate risk. If contracts are written to encourage
collaboration between service providers, then there will be a steady stream
of funding that can be adjusted annually based on the needs of the annual
outgoing prison population. Each year, the data sets will grow, allowing
programs to be better tailored to population needs. Moreover, the funding

414.
415.
416.
417.
418.
419.
420.
421.
422.
423.
424.
425.
426.
427.

See supra notes 281-84 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 285-88 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 289-92 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 293-97 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 298-301 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 302-06 and accompanying text.
See supra note 311 and accompanying text.
See supra note 313 and accompanying text.
See supra note 319 and accompanying text.
See supra note 320 and accompanying text.
See supra note 321 and accompanying text.
See supra note 325 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 326-33 and accompanying text.
See supra Section II.C.5.
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will come from private investors, and tax payers will only have to pay for
successful outcomes so there will not be an additional strain on state budgets.
Successful housing programs for formerly incarcerated people that reduce
recidivism will also reduce state expenditures on recidivism, resulting in an
aggregated cost savings in budgetary dollars. Therefore, since the state will
only be responsible for paying for successful outcomes, PFS provides states
with a great opportunity to help not only those who are high risk, but to
engage in preventative measures to assist first time offenders and stop the
cycle of poverty and recidivism before it can begin.
States can also set outcome targets that are tailored to each specific
program and need. For example, for those struggling with drug addiction, a
metric of success could be six months of stable housing and sobriety.
Particularly when implementing scaled up versions of proven non-profit
models, states can set reasonable and achievable targets by looking to the
metrics non-profits use to measure their own success. Likewise, states may
also experiment with different targets that may be more effective at
illustrating results and success. Moreover, states can even collect data
through PFS on other related and important metrics. For instance, a program
that helps those struggling with drug addiction can also collect information
on the number and cost of emergency room visits of those participating in
the program. Thus, states can not only help individuals, but can also collect
data related to important state services that are otherwise difficult to
ascertain.
CONCLUSION
Hundreds of thousands of individuals are released from prison annually
and face a host of barriers to securing housing upon their reentry. Housing
is the key to successful re-entry. Without housing, everything else falls
apart. States can not only save budget dollars by reducing recidivism
through securing safe housing for formerly incarcerated people, but also can
help whole communities and provide meaningful second chances for many
individuals.
The current litigation regime is too limited to make any real systemic
difference in society or to offer practical help to those being discriminated
against due to their criminal histories. State governments are currently
facing a crisis of funding at the federal level, and are likely unwilling or
unable to fund housing programs for the formerly incarcerated though
traditional government public financing mechanisms. The PFS model is a
unique tool that would allow states to invest in programs that offer true
second chances to formerly incarcerated people that begin with securing
safe, stable, and affordable housing. States have used this model to tackle
issues that overlap with recidivism; however, few states have focused
specifically on reducing recidivism with a primary focus on housing.
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Responsibly designed, implemented, and operated PFS programs provide
states with the unique opportunity to do just that.

